CHICAM WP1:

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE:

CHILDREN AND MIGRATION OVERVIEW

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1. Some facts and figures

The six countries participating in the Chicam project have several things in common but there are also some clear differences. They are all nation states with one dominant national group and one national language. They are parliamentary democracies and members of the European Union. Germany, Greece and Italy are republics. The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK are constitutional monarchies. Germany is a federal republic. The UK has recently transferred certain powers to regional assemblies for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. All countries have some small and politically marginalized ethno-territorial and border minorities. The Welsh and Gaelic people in Wales and Scotland and the Saami of Sweden appear to be indigenous peoples. The population sizes of the six countries vary considerably - from 82.2 million in Germany to 8.9 million for Sweden.

All countries have experienced large-scale migration, however, starting at different periods of time and coming from different sending countries. The stock of first generation migrants in these six countries alone is over 16 million, approximately equalling the total population of the Netherlands. If we include their children we will arrive at a figure between 25 and 30 million. Refugees are an increasing part of the migrant stocks. Migration is usually undertaken by young people. This means that migrant populations are younger than host country populations. Migrant families are moreover on the whole larger with more children than families in the receiving countries. This means that children with migrant origins represent a larger share of the particular age cohort than the case is for their parents.

Albanians constitute the largest migrant groups in Italy and Greece. Moroccans are among the largest migrant groups in Italy and the Netherlands. Turkish migrants are the largest category in Germany and one of the largest in the Netherlands. Yugoslavs are an important migrant category in Germany and Sweden. We also have large communities of Romanians in Italy, Italians and Greeks in Germany, Finns and Iranians in Sweden, Surinamese and Indonesians in the Netherlands, and Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Afro-Caribbeans in the UK. Whereas many migrants to Italy and Greece can find work in the agricultural sector this is negligible in the other countries. Migrant labour is mainly found in industry and the service sector in Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and UK. Quite a large share of the migrant population is in small business (from street vending to tobacconists and takeaways).

Migrant populations are generally urban and tend to live in segregated neighbourhoods. Residential segregation carries over into other social domains. Young migrant children then go to schools that tend to reflect the segregation of the neighbourhood. Racism is prevalent in all six countries although its forms of manifestation vary.
The age of majority is 18 years in all countries. Compulsory schooling varies from nine years in Greece, Germany and Sweden to eleven years in Italy and the UK and twelve years in the Netherlands. Children start school at the age of four in the Netherlands, five in Italy and the UK, six in Germany and Greece, and seven in Sweden.

Stephen Castles, a British-Australian sociologist, has analysed the structures of migration and integration in empirical and theoretical work over the past thirty years. In some recent books he outlines the issues at hand very clearly (Castles and Miller 1998, Castles and Davidson 2000). The following overview is largely influenced by his thoughts on migration and globalization.

2. Migration to Europe at the turn of the millennium

Despite attempts to control and contain migration to Europe by national governments, the flows to Europe in the 1990s were larger than ever before. Only a few decades earlier Italy and Greece were major sending countries. Now they have significant migrant populations. International migration is intrinsically tied up with the globalization processes that are reshaping the international community. This new phase of mass population movements is likely to continue throughout the present decade. Children are very much part of these movements. Children migrate with their families, often through the family reunification entitlement. A small but growing number of child migrants are unaccompanied minors, who are sent off on their own, sometimes to escape conscription and the hazards of living in war zones, sometimes to prepare the ground for other family members in a receiving country, but sometimes as victims in the hands of ruthless traffickers. A third category is the children of migrants that are born in the receiving country. They are not migrants but the conditions in which they grow up differ from those of the national majority children. The children of migrants may at the same time be vulnerable to forces of social exclusion as well they may enjoy the advantages of being proficient in several languages.

Over the years immigration authorities have worked out operational categories that refer to different grounds of immigration - labour, refugees, family reunifications. The justification for this is that policies of immigration and integration have differed with regard to these categories. Whereas the intake of labour migrants is regulated by domestic needs and economic considerations, the acceptance of refugees and family reunification is justified by international conventions and humanitarian considerations. Although labour migration was stopped in the 1970s, western democracies continued to accept asylum-seekers and to provide refuge for them. The influx of individual asylum-seekers from Eastern Europe was never seen as a problem at the time when immigration was welcome, when there was no shortage of jobs and the economy was thriving. The administrative categories hardly interfered with individual opportunities. Things turned out differently once the gates started to close, when unemployment figures rose and when a long downturn of the economy commenced. The administrative distinctions are not meaningful from the individual migrant's perspective. Individuals migrate for a number of reasons and motives are often mixed. When the labour migration gate was closed other prospective migrants who better met with the refugee and family reunification criteria were encouraged to have a go. This is not to say that asylum seekers had no just grounds to seek protection. It is saying that the restrictive immigration policies enforced in the 1970s had unanticipated

sorting consequences on the populations of potential migrants. Gradually earlier administrative distinctions became meaningless.

Disparities between the developing countries of the south and the developed countries of the north have not been reduced since labour migration was stopped but have grown. Indicators of economic development all point to considerable differences in standards of living, health, demographic structure, life expectancy, education, national product and access to consumer goods. These differences affect migration movements, dramatically obvious along the US-Mexican border, but also manifest along the borders to the European Union. The demographic differentials are possibly the most striking. Age structures differ immensely with large young populations in the developing countries and ageing populations in the developed world. In developing countries half of the population is under fifteen years of age. In the developed world the fifty percent cut off point is over thirty-five. Countries in the developed world barely reproduce their own populations. In some there is a natural decline, and population is maintained at its present level only through immigration. These demographic developments will have immense global impacts on work forces. In developing countries young adults will be seeking employment on a market that is unable to provide enough jobs because of undeveloped infrastructure, lack of investments and unsatisfactory educational resources. People in their productive years in the developed world will have the burden of supporting a large elderly population. While the countries in the developed world want to reduce immigration for short-term policy objectives, the long-term demographic disparities will force them to increase their intake of manpower.

Globalization has brought out a growing interdependence between sending and receiving regions. People migrating in one direction send back remittances, images, ideas and values. Once chains of migration based on kinship establish they tend to assume a momentum beyond the control of the authorities. These networks play an important economic role for the sending as well as receiving areas. Development aid has been seen as an instrument to even out the economic differences between the South and the North. Ultimately it is thought to reduce the migration potential from the South. What advocates of this theory fail to realize is that economic development through education and modernization increases and reinforces the migration potential. It does not reduce it.

The developed countries are moving from an industrial economy based on manufacture to a post-industrial economy of which crucial elements are information technology and microelectronics. Developing countries are taking over the manufacturing tasks. The developed economies are thus moving to a situation in which industry no longer needs unskilled manpower for simple monotonous jobs. Today robots handle these tasks. The economies are geared to provide services to a much higher degree than before. Budgetary restrictions, however, limit the amount of jobs that the public sector is able to provide in the educational and caring sectors. Unemployment levels rose in many developed countries as a result of the mid-1990s downturn. Immigrants and ethnic minorities were hard hit. When the economies eventually

recovered the situation for these groups only improved marginally. The principal companies on the post-industrial scene operate across international boundaries and handle budgets that exceed the national product of many European welfare states. These multinational corporations and companies are themselves important power factors.

The developed welfare states of the North need to handle a number of tasks - managing urban problems and distributing goods, welfare, education and social integration. The nation state in its liberal democratic version proved to be a successful model through its control of territory, people and political power. Globalization threatens the nation state in that migration inevitably will lead to a questioning of the national myth of cultural homogeneity, common history and common destiny on which the legitimacy of the nation state rests. Ethnic minorities merging into mainstream society tend to be regarded as a problem by the receiving country. A nation state is not prepared to part voluntarily with any of its territory, nor is it willing to relinquish its national identity. European nation states are coping with the situation through two different policies - multiculturalism, the aim of which is to incorporate ethnic minorities, and immigration control which in practice means to close as many gates of immigration as possible. The goals are not reconcilable and can lead to conflicting outcomes.

These developments have triggered new forms of social conflict and exclusion. The new right in Europe is seen as a reaction to globalization and multiculturalism. The end of the Cold War, often thought of as starting with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, but probably more correctly starting with Gorbachev's moves to reform the stagnant Soviet economy in the mid-1980s, happened to coincide with the break-through of information technology. During the forty years of the Cold War, liberal western democracies conceived of Soviet Communism as their moral, political and existential antithesis and thus their principal contrasting identity. Soviet Communism represented an image of the Other in countless films and novels from the Cold War years. It is true that some relatively small or marginalized communist parties were present in many western democracies - the Italian and French communist parties had considerable followings but parties to the middle of the political spectrum effectively checked their access to power. The Western European communist parties broke their ties with the Soviet Union after Hungary 1956. When the Cold War came to an end this contrasting identity just evaporated. However it was soon replaced in popular thought by the traditional and historically more salient stereotype of the Muslim as the archetypal Other. Leaders of some Muslim countries (Iran, Iraq and Libya) willingly assumed this role, exploiting the other side of the reciprocal stereotype to point out Israel, the USA and the western world in general as the irreconcilable enemy and foe. The renewed focus on the Muslim as the Other in popular perceptions adversely affected the large Muslim populations present in western European countries. Muslims were stereotyped as a culturally alien and non-assimilable part of the population, a perception that the new right willingly exploited and disseminated.

Integrating migrant populations into receiving societies brought the whole question of political rights and citizenship for migrants to the fore. The concept of citizenship is being broadened in several respects. Various states have reluctantly accepted dual citizenship as a possible solution. This reluctance is an indicator of changes in the nation state idiom. While most European states follow the ius sanguinis principle of granting citizenship (the principle of soil in which citizenship is conferred to persons who are born in the territory of the state), Germany being a notorious example, some countries follow the ius soli interpretation (according to which citizenship is conferred on the strength of blood relationship), most notably the UK. Other principles of granting citizenship are also being discussed, for instance a tentative ius domicilis. Another idea is that citizenship does not only represent membership of a state but also encompasses social and cultural dimensions. One specific background to this development is the move to recognize a Supra-national European citizenship. Citizenship policies have become principal instruments for integrating increasingly multicultural societies.

3. Europe as a scene of immigration and ethnic relations

Immigration to Europe started on a large scale after World War II. Countries of origin varied, and so did responses from the receiving countries, types of immigration, and periods of large-scale immigration. Europe represents considerable diversity with regard to cultures, histories, economic development and immigration experiences.

Three countries on the Atlantic seaboard had large intakes of migrants from former colonies in the 1950s and 1960s—the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. The bulk of this post-colonial migration was of visible minorities, people whose phenotypic traits distinguish them from (what used to be) the somatic norm image of native European populations. Thus the issue of race and racism was on the political agenda earlier in these countries than elsewhere in Europe. Immigration to the UK consisted mainly of British subjects from the Caribbean, East Africa and the Indian subcontinent, not forgetting the vast Irish migration. The Netherlands had a relatively large influx of migrants from the former Dutch East Indies and Surinam, but also many Moroccans and Turks on guest worker programmes.

Another group of countries may be classified as Central and North European, and comprising of Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. Basically these countries resemble each other with regard to a large intake of manpower in the 1950s and 1960s, mainly from southern Europe - Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Sweden had an intake of labour from Finland. While Germany imported labour within a guest worker framework, Sweden strove to incorporate migrant labour into mainstream society through the systems of the welfare state. In the 1950s and 1960s when labour was in demand discrimination didn't noticeably affect unemployment rates. It was experienced in more subtle ways through limited

career opportunities and prejudicial attitudes. Ethnocentrism and xenophobia were present but the full impact of racism didn't emerge until the 1970s and 1980s when new categories of migrants started to appear on the scene - asylum-seekers from non-European countries. The so-called *Aussiedler* are a specific category of "returnees" from Eastern Europe who claim German ancestry. Recognized as "ethnic" Germans they are entitled to settlement and citizenship in the Federal Republic of Germany. During the Cold War numbers were rather small for obvious reasons. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall they have grown immensely.

In the 1980s Southern Europe (here represented by Greece and Italy) turned into a region of immigration. Previously these countries, together with Yugoslavia, were major senders. Today Italy in particular and Greece are experiencing an exceptionally high influx of undocumented migrants from some principal sending regions - the Mahgreb, the horn of Africa, Albania, the Philippines and Latin America. Greece has received refugees from Albania and other Balkan countries as well as a return migration from the Greek Diaspora, both former labour migrants in Western Europe and the classic Diasporic communities around the Black Sea (the so called Pontic Greeks). Immigration has caught these countries by surprise. Policies have not yet developed to incorporate migrants into the host society, and little has been done to counteract racism and discrimination.

These different contexts of immigration and ethnic relations, and the social and economic development of the countries in question, have shaped a wide range of policies and strategies to deal with increasing diversity, problems of intergroup relations, racism and discrimination in the labour market.

4. Citizenship and incorporation

Migrants from the Indian subcontinent and Caribbean settling in the UK were technically speaking not immigrants because they were already British subjects. Much the same applied to people coming to the Netherlands from the Dutch East Indies. The UK represents the clearest example of the *ius soli* principle. However, the UK is also taking on the other main principle - *ius sanguinis.*

The German guest-worker policies represent a diametrically different case to the British post-colonial immigration model. Guest workers were not entitled to naturalize. They were not even recognized as migrants. The Netherlands and Sweden represent a mid-way position, accepting foreign workers as migrants and seeking to incorporate them into society through the mechanisms of the welfare system. The *ius sanguinis* principle applies in these three countries as well as in Italy and Greece. There are disparities however. Because of its strong ethnic ties German citizenship is extremely difficult to acquire through naturalization, whereas it is relatively uncomplicated to naturalize to Dutch or Swedish citizenship. For instance, no tests of language or knowledge are involved in the Swedish case. However, it should be mentioned in all fairness

that Germany has recently introduced a more liberal interpretation of its naturalization rules.

As a rule the *ius sanguinis* principle is not compatible with dual citizenship since ideally identity, as determined by the legal status of citizenship on the one hand, and the subjective sense of national identity based on ethnic, cultural and linguistic criteria on the other, should overlap. Countries following the *ius soli* principle have found it easier to accept dual citizenship. It follows that if different ethnicities are compatible with one specific citizenship, then one ethnicity may be compatible with two citizenships.

Despite the fact that Germany has received more immigrants than the USA over the past fifty years, paradoxically it hasn't seen itself as a country of immigration. Consequently it hasn't recognized people of migrant origin as a permanent part of its population. The redrawn German borders after World War II and the division into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), led to massive population shifts. Before the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961 hundreds of thousands left the GDR each year to settle in the west. Anyone who can present evidence of German ancestry is entitled to German citizenship, a right laid down in the constitution of the FRG. After the fall of the communist regimes in Europe, great numbers of *Aussiedler* made use of this provision. The rights of the *Aussiedler* are a striking contrast to the situation of the descendants of guest workers. No targeted integration policies have been enforced pertaining to the guest workers and their descendants since these groups were never intended to settle permanently in Germany. Social exclusion is the logical outcome of this approach. A certain degree of integration has nevertheless taken place through the economic system and participation in the labour market.

Italy, historically one of Europe's major sending countries, is now an important recipient of migrants. Large-scale immigration is a recent phenomenon, and within the space of little more than a decade the number of migrants in Italy has skyrocketed. There has been little time to develop well-conceived policies on integration. A major concern is the large number of undocumented migrants. The regularization of the undocumented migrants, in effect amnesty, has top priority today. An awareness of the impact of immigration is growing at all levels, but nothing concrete has come out of it yet. Italy is struggling to come to grips with problems of political corruption, its Fascist past and organized crime in the south. The lack of clear policies is creating a situation of confusion and panic. The Greek situation is somewhat similar.

The Netherlands has a long tradition of immigration and providing refuge for persecuted (religious) minorities. The country has strong liberal traditions and is known for its toleration of life-styles on the margins of society. These traditions are partly an outcome of its geopolitical position between three major European powers but also of its history as a sea-faring nation. Morality is an individual matter, not a concern of others, an attitude reflecting the founding liberal values of the Dutch nation. Assimilation of newcomers was never an explicit requirement. Even quite far back in time provisions were made to safeguard the autonomy of religious and cultural minorities. As one of

the first states in Europe, the Netherlands adopted a multicultural policy. The aim to establish a multicultural society is creating an acceptance of diversity, despite some infrequent backlashes of racist violence. The logical consequence of the Dutch policies is integration, and indications are that the Netherlands is managing to accomplish this objective.

The mechanism of the welfare state serves as the basic momentum of integration in Sweden. It is a model that was developed several decades earlier to enforce the political transformation of traditional class society to a modern egalitarian state in which social stratification is less rigid. The educational system is a cornerstone of the model, which explains the authorities' reluctance to accept schools based on ethnicity or confession. Another basic instrument is participation in the polity. This was achieved by extending the franchise to foreign citizens who are permanent residents in local and county elections. A complementary strategy is to encourage naturalization and, as from 2001, to accept dual citizenship. The official policy in Sweden is to promote integration. But there is a hidden agenda indicating that assimilation is the desired outcome. "Ethnic diversity is all very well but things should be done according to the Swedish model!" These conflicting goals have furthered a situation of segregation rather than integration.

The British situation is different again. Post-colonial visible migrants who were British subjects dominated immigration. The Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968, however, put an end to this spontaneous immigration. At the time this Act was implemented kinship networks were already well established between sending regions and migrant communities in the UK. People find ways of entering and settling in the UK legally. Families reunify, marriages take place. Today a majority of those of Afro-Caribbean, Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Indian origin are born in the UK as the second or third generation of the original migrants. Although British social, economic and political conditions have had their impact on minority cultures, certain distinctive values, traditions and belief systems have nevertheless withstood pressures of cultural assimilation. The UK has no direct integration policy comparable to the Dutch or Swedish initiatives. On the other hand the fight against racism and discrimination has a much longer history and stronger position than in any of the other countries of our sample. The challenge today is how to maintain ethnic diversity, how to support minority groups, and how to voice ethnic and cultural interests.

5.   Children and globalization

It goes without saying that the media, and in particular the electronic media, are a cornerstone of globalisation by way of instant communication, the dissemination of information and images of life-styles, values and opportunities. Globalisation is an irreversible structural fact, something that forever will affect societal conditions on this planet in the future. Globalisation is not the same thing as US (Western) cultural and economic imperialism, although as the only military super power and the most powerful economy of the world, the US is in the lead when it comes to exploiting the opportunities presented by globalisation. Rather globalisation is about the encounter of

modernity and tradition, the blending of the global and the local, and what this means in terms of cultural development. Globalization is thus not about casting much the same identities on a world-wide arena, but rather about moulding new identities, amalgamating both modern and traditional elements. As social change is basically a matter of generational succession, and less a matter of individual converting, children are essential conveyors of social change. Unlike any generation before them children of our own times are socialised in a world of globalisation. Their grandparents grew up with radio and their parents with national television. Today's children are growing up with both local and global broadcasting media, and above all with the Internet. Migrant children and children of migrants have a special part to play in this context.

A considerable amount of research has been produced in each of the three subject areas: children, media and migration. The importance of the Chicam project is that it addresses questions about children in communication about migration, thus linking these different areas of expertise together within one comparative framework. The following sections are country reports setting out basic structural conditions in each of the six countries. Readers should however be aware that statistics and other documentation in the different countries may vary considerably and that categories used may have very different connotations. In the UK report Liesbeth de Block spelt out seven conditions that one needs to be aware of when putting together information in these areas. Although referring to the UK context her points also apply broadly speaking to the other country reports. I have taken the liberty to reproduce her points here as a general methodological introduction to the report.

a. Children do not appear separately in the statistics from adults
It is often necessary to read between the lines in order to get a picture of where children sit or what are the main issues that affect them.

b. From available statistics it is difficult to get a picture of white immigration
Immigration to the UK has always been commonly understood as 'black' migration although currently immigration from the Old Commonwealth[1] is higher than any other group. Most writing and statistics concentrate on discussions of ethnic minorities. Since CHICAM is mainly concerned with this group this report also takes this focus although as an overall approach it is problematic.

c. The categorisations of ethnicity are confusing
Categories often mix nationality, language, region, skin colour and religion. This means that certain groups are highlighted while others become invisible. For example 'Turkish' is often classified under white so they don't appear as a separate group although their circumstances and needs might be different. It also means that differentiation within categories is impossible.

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[1] Old Commonwealth refers to Australia, New Zealand and Canada. New Commonwealth refers to former colonies in the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. The distinction has the effect of separating out 'white' and 'black' migration.

d. Categories are used in different ways by different surveys and different writers making comparisons and analyses confusing. Terms will also change over time with different political imperatives and understandings

Ethnic monitoring is relatively recent. There has been much discussion and many changes to how this is done. Some terms such as 'black' will be used in many different ways. Sometimes it is used as a political term that has even included Irish. At others it becomes specific to skin colour or again to region of origin as in 'black African' or 'black Caribbean' or ancestral origin 'Afro Caribbean'. Asian in the UK refers to people and countries near India (India itself, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka). It does not refer, as it does in Australia and New Zealand to Pacific rim peoples and countries.

e. Terms such as 'minority' and 'majority' imply fixed immoveable categories

This implies that the majority includes no differences while the minorities will have more in common with other minorities than with the majority. It takes no account of differences of class, region, gender age etc. within each category.

f. Many documents don't differentiate between newly arrived ethnic migrants and those who have been here for several generations.

This implies that all ethnic minorities are somehow foreign. It also takes no account of the different experiences of first and second generation. It also ignores the different experiences of immigrants from former colonies with historical connections, those who have family connections here and those arriving on their own.

g. Strict categorisations disallow self-determination. They don't reflect the fact that people use shifting terms and not fixed determinants. They have also (up to very recently) ignore those of mixed race.

The Parekh Report (Runnymede Trust, 2000) discusses the use of terminology and tries to avoid the use of terms they regard as misleading such as 'ethnic' and 'minority'.

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CHILDREN AND MIGRATION: GERMANY

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1. Introduction

The Federal Republic of Germany currently has a total population of 82,163,475, with a density of 230 inhabitants per square kilometre, national area 357,020 sq.km. (Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2002, p. 181). Over 1/4 of the German population is over 60 years old, only 1/5 has not yet reached the age of 30 (Weiß & Trebbe 2001, p. 11). On 31.12.2000 8,9% of the total number of inhabitants were migrants (ibid, p. 237). One in every four migrants comes from an EU member state. Over 2/3 have been living in the Republic for more than ten years and of the migrant children living in Germany 4/5 were born there (Hamburger 2001, p. 1213).

Children in Germany begin their schooling between the ages of 6 and 7; primary school lasts four years. Depending on their achievement level and the teachers' evaluation they then go on to one of the following:
-Sonderschule (special needs school, for children with learning difficulties)
-Gesamtschule (comprehensive school)
-Hauptschule[2] (secondary school, together with primary school 4+5 = 9 years)
-Realschule (secondary school, together with primary school 4+6 =10 years)
-Gymnasium (grammar school, together with primary school 4+9 =13 years)
Each of these school types offers a certain amount of flexibilty and children can move from one type to another at later stages.

2. Migration

"We called for workers and people came."
        (Max Frisch, Swiss author)

"A stranger is only a stranger in a strange land."
        (Karl Valentin, comedian and author from Munich)

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[2] The proportion of children and adolescents from migrant background attending "Hauptschulen" (roughly equivalent to secondary modern schools, the least intellectually demanding of the three types) is particularly high (cf.. PISA 2000, p. 37). "Hauptschulen" are considered to be problematic with regard to future job prospects (cf. Zukunftskommission Gesellschaft 2000, pp. 106-109).

2.1 The general picture

Immigrants in the German Republic can be divided into three groups (Hamburger 2001; p. 1213):

          Migrant workers

          Refugees

          Settlers (people of German extraction who have returned to Germany)

A large number of migrant workers were invited to Germany as so-called "guest workers". The FRG made agreements with Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968) (Terkessidis 2000, p. 18).Because of the oil crisis in 1973, this form of labour recruitment came to a stop (Hamburger 2001, p. 1213). The original plan was for migrants to come to Germany for a limited period and for them to be replaced after a while by newly arrived immigrants (Meister & Sander 1998, p. 189). However, the reality of the migrants' lives proved incompatible with this "rotation model". Many migrants decided to stay in the FRG and to re-unite the family here. Others returned to their homeland. The number of migrants in proportion to the total population varies from region to region.

Table 4 1. Foreign Minorities living in the Federal Republic of Germany in Order of Size, as at 31st December 1998. (Source: Bundesverwaltungsamt — Ausländerzentralregister)

Nationality	Foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany			
	Total	Male	Female	percentage of the foreign population
	7.319.593	4.027.265	3.292.328	*100,0*
1. Turkish	2.110.223	1.145.057	965.166	28,8
2. FR Yugoslavian (Serbia/Montenegro)	719.474	409.157	310.317	*9,8*
3. Italian	612.048	366.095	245.953	*8,4*
4. Greek	363.514	200.045	163.469	*5,0*
5. Polish	283.604	149.383	134.221	*3,9*
6. Croatian	208.909	107.358	101.551	*2,9*
7. Bosnian and Herzegovinian	190.119	98.661	91.458	*2,6*
8. Austrian	185.159	101.671	83.488	*2,5*
9. Portuguese	132.578	76.634	55.944	*1,8*
10. Spanish	131.121	69.352	61.769	*1,8*
11. Iranian, Islam. Republic	115.094	68.756	46.338	*1,6*
12. British	114.055	67.915	46.140	*1,6*

13. Dutch	112.072	60.320	51.752	*1,5*
14. USA	110.680	63.416	47.264	*1,5*
15. French	105.808	48.912	56.896	*1,5*
16. Rumanian	89.801	51.590	38.211	*1,2*
17.Vietnamese	85.452	48.056	37.396	*1,2*
18. Moroccan	82.748	50.257	32.491	*1,1*
19. Afghan	68.267	37.873	30.394	*0,9*
20. Lebanese	55.074	32.538	22.536	*0,8*
21.Hungarian	51.905	33.012	18.893	*0,7*

(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 2000, p. 233)

The Turkish migrant minority is the largest in Germany[3] . Together with migrants from Italy and Greece, they have become a particularly visible group in everyday life. These groups are strongly represented in areas such as gastronomy (restaurants and take-aways) and retailing (grocery stores and greengrocers').[4] Germany has become de facto an immigration country, even though a number of politicians would not have it so (Braun-von der Brelie 1997, p. 647). People can be categorised as "foreigners" ("Ausländer") according to very different criteria. It is common practice, for example, to define those people living in Germany who do not possess a German passport as "foreign".[5]

Specialist literature, on the other hand, rarely differentiates between those migrants who possess German nationality, those who do not, and those who have both German and another nationality ("double passport").The OSZE study, PISA 2000, differentiates between 15 year olds whose parents were both born in Germany, those with one German-born parent, and those whose parents were both born in another country (PISA 2000, p. 37 ff.).

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the most common nationalities. Table 4.2 (over the page) shows the numbers of migrants over a period of time. With very few exceptions, the proportion of minority groups in relation to the total number of inhabitants has increased steadily. It is noticeable from statistical information that that there is a predominance of male migrants in every age group. Generally speaking, one can say that the younger the person, the more

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[3] As the Turkish minority is the largest migrant group in Germany, a comparatively large amount of research has been carried out on people with Turkish migrant backgrounds. We would like to point out the "Zentrum für Tükeistudien" (http://www.uni-essen.de/zft/english.html) in this connection..

[4] It could be said that the majority passes value judgements on the cultures of the minority groups. Whilst Italy, on the one hand, stands for culinary enjoyment and the joy of living in the eyes of many Germans (also shown in media representation such as advertising), Poland or other East European countries give rise to far less positive associations and images.

[5] Fritsche (2000, p. 364) reports in connection with the 13th Shell Youth Study on the problems caused by the, technically justifiable, but nonetheless unfortunate, differentiation between "German" and "foreign" adolescents. Some young people felt themselves to be foreigners despite holding a German passport and filled out the questionnaire for migrants. Others felt excluded through the use of this terminology.

likely s/he is to have been born in Germany. Table 4.4 (over the page) shows the distribution of migrant pupils, according to nationality and type of school.

Since 1981 private Greek schools have been established in a number of German cities. These fall under the administration of the Greek ministry of culture (Grundschulen, Mittelschulen und Gymnasien; cf.. Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1994, p. 238).

Table 4.2. Foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1960. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt/Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (Federal Office for Statistics/Federal Employment Institute)

Year	Foreign Inhabitants (in thousands)	Proportion of foreign inhabitants to total number of inhabitants (in %)	Employees paying compulsory social insurance (in thousands)
1960	686,2	*1,2*	279,4
1970	**2.976,5**	***4,9***	**1.838,9**
1980	4.453,3	*7,2*	1.925,6
1990	**5.342,5**	***8,4***	**1.793,4**
1991 [4]	5.882,3	*7,3*	1 .908,7
1992	6.495,8	*8,0*	2.119,6
1993	6.878,1	*8,5*	2.150,1
1994	6.990,5	*8,6*	2.109,7
1995	7.173,9	*8,8*	2.094,0
1996	7.314,0	*8,9*	2.009,7
1997	7.365,8	*9,0*	1.997,8
1998	7.319,6	*8,9*	2.030,3[5]

4) From 1991 results for whole of Germany (both West and former East Germany) (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 2000, p. 231)

Table 4.4. Foreign Pupils within the general, compulsory education system in 1997. Source: Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (Federal Ministry for Education and Research)

Nationa-lity	of which at										
	Total	Pre-schoolclasses	School nursery schools	Primary schools	Haupt-schulen	Schools with variety of systems	Real-schulen	Gym-nasien	Comprehensive/ private schools -	Evening classes and College	Special needs schools
Greek	33.562	122	221	12.652	9.207	110	3.576	3.847	1.875	251	1.701
Italian	72.4	107	659	29.9	20.4	425	6.75	4.33	3.784	354	5.57

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	58			75	91		1	8			4
Spanish	8.947	25	50	3.185	1.722	13	1.244	1.410	723	141	434
Turkish	403.574	3.267	5.219	181.730	100.497	1.366	30.352	22.222	31.255	3.089	24.577
Yugo-slavian [1]	70.378	375	989	29.250	18.329	357	5.021	4.631	2.896	327	8.203
Portu-guese	12.608	59	80	5.193	3.235	64	1.242	1.216	676	112	731
Others	23.685	782	441	8.090	2.922	231	1.199	3.161	3.496	130	3.233
Total	950.707	6.671	9.872	400.423	231.018	4.644	78.436	87.826	64.812	8.424	58.581

1) Serbia and Montenegro
(Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 2000, p. 250)

2.1 Refugees

Generally speaking, have left their country to escape from political or religious persecution and seek asylum under paragraph 16 of the German Constitution. They can be divided into six groups as follows (cf. Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2000, p. 47; Hamburger 2001, p. 1214):

refugees seeking asylum status

refugees whose status has been confirmed (asylum has been granted);

refugees whose rights to such a status have been officially recognised;

refugees with an automatic right to asylum, whereby the number of applicants who can be granted asylum is limited, or to whom certain restrictions apply;

War and civil war refugees (residency is regulated by the person concerned);

De facto refugees (residency/asylum has been refused, they are not extradited for political, legal or humanitarian reasons).

The "Aussiedler" or **returning settlers**: that is to say, those of German extraction who have lived – sometimes for many generations – in a foreign country (particularly Eastern Europe and Russia,) and who have special rights, as they are legally considered German nationals. The cultural links with Germany have often ceased to exist, especially among the younger generation. A comparatively wide range of integration measures are available, and this minority can hence be considered as relatively privileged (Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend 2000, p. 59). On the subject of children from "Aussiedler" backgrounds see Dietz (1999) and the Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend (2000, pp. 56-62 and. 136-138).

3. Special issues

"Asylum politics is currently conducted purely under the heading of exclusion."
Heiko Kaufmann, Pro Asyl press officer (Gerstner 2002, p. 5)

According to PRO ASYL[6] there are approximately 5,000 unaccompanied minors living officially in Germany as refugees. The number of refugee children living unofficially in the Republic is unknown. Most of these children come from Turkey, the Near East, West Africa, Sri Lanka and, more recently, from Eastern Europe and North Africa (PRO ASYL 1996, p. 18; in: Holzapfel 1999, p. 176).

The following aspects are based on Sobotta (1997) and Boumans (1997). Often, unaccompanied minors must flee the country at a second's notice, with no time to take leave of their relatives and friends. Such children and adolescents frequently give the possibility of a better education as the reason for their flight, with no mention of the political situation. Their flight is a costly affair, involving emotional deprivation. Their parents' expectations are usually very high. The unaccompanied minors should behave well, learn a great deal, achieve good results at the end of their schooling, earn money and send their earnings back to their homeland. These refugees, as they grow older, are under enormous pressure to succeed.

Other aspects, besides these pressures, play an important part:

the loss of familiar surroundings and mode of existence

the necessity of orientating themselves in a foreign/strange society (unfamiliar norms and values, foreign language) – which often poses excessive demands;

the burden of past, sometimes traumatic, experiences, (war, imprisonment, massacres, shootings) combined with the inability to express this verbally, due to insufficient knowledge of the (foreign) language;

Uncertainty as regards the future. Fear that the application for asylum might be refused. Fear of being deported, especially in the knowledge that it is impossible to return to their homeland. Fear of becoming homeless or losing their legal status.

Being excluded and discriminated against;

discussing matters openly with their parents is hazardous or very difficult (fear of censorship makes letter-writing an inaccurate and vague form of communication)

psychological problems: feeling inwardly torn; guilty toward the relatives and friends who have remained in their homeland; fear that they cannot fulfil the demands made on them and feelings of guilt when they do not; the danger of re-traumatisation when faced with certain situations, such as interviews, which are similar to interrogations they had to undergo in their country of origin; threat to their hard-won stability when suppressed

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[6] PRO ASYL is an association which concerns itself with the fate of refugees all over Germany, seeking to draw attention to their situation and working towards both more humane treatment of refugees and a more humane policy on asylum. (Internet: www.proasyl.de). The National Institution for Unaccompanied Refugee Minors demands improvements in the current situation of such refugees in the German Republic.

experiences re-surface, tension between being expected to conform to the cultural norms of the host country at the same time as remaining faithful to the values and norms of their country of origin.

Too little professional attention has been paid to the psychological situation of unaccompanied minors. Psychosocial care and support are needed here; more staff should be employed. A regulation stating that unaccompanied minors over the age of 16 are no longer entitled to the services provided for in the Children and Youth Aid Law (Kinder- und Jugendhilfegesetz) is considered highly problematic.

4. Settlement

4.1 Identity and the Sense of Belonging

In the Shell Youth Study 2000, Turkish and German adolescents were asked, among other things, about their own lives and about living 'side by side' in Germany (Blank 2000). Qualitative interviews were carried out with 48 young Turkish and German men and women between the ages of 15 and 24. The double estrangement or twofold foreign-ness, as experienced by many young people (cf. title of report "Fremde hier wie dort" – "Likewise a stranger here and there") seems to be of particular significance. A twenty-year old woman expressed it thus: "I am a foreigner here, in Turkey I am a foreigner, too." (Blank 2000, p. 19)

On the other hand, young people see being at home or having roots in two cultures both as a skill and as something special. An adolescent with Greek migrant background, living in the German Republic, emphasises this competence: "We have our own profile, we are at home in both worlds...". (Govaris 1999, p. 114).

Riegel (1999) has revealed, analysing a particular district in Stuttgart, that adolescents from migrant backgrounds identify themselves to a large extent with their "quarter" and that this feeling of belonging and commitment to an area, together with their identification with their country of origin and their host country, provides an important opportunity for identifying. The feeling of belonging to a town or a specific part of it makes it possible to develop a sense of identification beyond ethnic and religious categories (cf. Schiffauer 1999). A nineteen-year-old man expresses his feeling of belonging thus: "My home is not Turkey or Germany or Frankfurt, my home is Sachsenhausen." (Rössing & Lindner 2000, p. 351)

The Hip-Hop youth scene provides an area in which many adolescents from different cultural backgrounds and contexts can "position themselves". In a number of HipHop bands problems specific to migrants, such as exclusion, discrimination, racism and xenophobia form the main, directly expressed theme of their texts.

4.2 Living Conditions

The living accommodation of refugees is often in marginalized locations (on the outskirts of the town) and in socio-economically disadvantaged areas (DJI Project "Mulitkulturelles Kinderleben 2000a, p. 31). Frequently, this results in social isolation. Generally these living quarters are not popular with the inhabitants living nearby. The inhabitants of the host country, (in particular those living in the neighbourhood of the refugee/migrant accommodation) should be thoroughly informed and prepared.

The living conditions in these quarters are, in most cases, unsatisfactory.: insufficient space, inadequate hygienic facilities, too little privacy, disruptive conditions for learning and education, problematic social dynamics (people from different countries of origin living together in one room).[7]

A process of geographical concentration has taken place, not only among asylum seekers, but also among migrants. Certain areas of a town become particularly attractive to people from migrant backgrounds because they offer affordable rents. On the other hand migrants are often forced to settle in areas which the majority consider undesirable. Community life in an area of Stuttgart (Raitelsberg) was looked into in detail within the scope of a research project entitled "International Learning. Adolescents between Exclusion and Integration" (Held & Spona 1999).

Concentration and segregation processes can undoubtedly cause problems. Modern, progressive town planing can provide a basis upon which multi-ethnic communication structures can be built and encouraged. Areas in which there is a high concentration of migrant groups can be perceived as "ghettos", in which contact with the majority is restricted or problematic, on the other hand, seen as a "colony", it can provide an emotionally stabilising influence, allowing inter-group support and identification to take place (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen 2000, p. 158).

4.3 Relationship between Generations

Particularly in families with a migrant background, changes in the customary relationship between generations often occur, in the sense that the younger generation has the advantage of competency. Children from families who have left their country of origin often act as language and culture mediators or agents for newcomers. (DJI-Projekt "Multikulturelles Kinderleben" 2000a, p. 14). For heads of families, in particular, this can mean a problematic loss of competency and authority.

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[7] The collection of photographs entitled "Asylbilder" gives a visual impression of the reality of refugees' lives (Rosswog 1996).

5. Racism and discrimination

"Children instead of people from India." ("Kinder statt Inder.") (Political slogan created by the conservative politician Jürgen Rüttgers (CDU) in context of the German greencard discussion concerning the immigration of computer experts from India))

Racism, xenophobia and discrimination are very serious problems in Germany (It ranges from various obvious acts of discrimination and exclusion in everyday life (often on a linguistic level, too) to physical attacks and even killings.[8]) Within the context of scarce resources (work, housing), above all, xenophobic discourse and interpretive patterns fall upon fertile ground: "Foreigners take our jobs away from us"; "The boat is full"; "Germany for the Germans"; "asylum abuse"; "Foreigners are violent and dangerous/criminal".

"The Republicans" (REP) is a party with a xenophobic policy, which has been able, again and again, to win votes. Up to now they have not been able to gain seats in the federal parliament. Two other extreme right (or national front) parties have been the subject of heated discussion: the "German National Union" (Deutsche Volksunion or DVU) and the "German National Democratic Party" (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD). The government has applied to the Federal Constitutional Court for a ban on the NPD.

Following the events of 11th September 2001 in the USA, people from Arabian countries feel that they have become the object of increased animosity. On a political level, discussions are being held on tightening immigration laws and placing certain restrictions on personal freedom, in favour of internal security.

A variety of explanatory theories and influencing factors are to be found in literature concerned with the causes of extreme right wing (national front) orientation:[9]

> Deficiences in education and socialisation;
> lack of experience/contact with foreigners/foreignness;
> Chauvinism based on affluence (cf. Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1994, p. 83);
> Groups within the population who feel neglected by the established political parties and wish to voice their protest (ibid.);
> Functionalisation of marginalised groups of the population as "scapegoats" (ibid.);

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[8] In the nineties, refugee accommodation was often singled out for surprise attacks. In some cases, citizens looking on applauded as xenophobic offenders threw Molotov-cocktails at the windows.
[9] On the subject of right-wing extremism and young people, cf. Heitmeyer et al. (1993) and Leiprecht (1995).

Decrease in solidarity due to individualisation[10]/modernisation (ibid.);

Desire for clear models in times of orientation difficulties and confusion;

Increase in self-esteem based on something (being German) which has not been achieved through one's own efforts, but is the result of circumstance;

difficult economic situations (unemployment, shortage of living space) in which right-wing discourse offers (exonerating) explanations;

Extreme right-wing orientation as a response to neo-liberalism, dismantling of the welfare state, deregulation and international competition (Butterwegge/Hickel/Ptak 1998).

The government has sponsored projects aimed at reducing xenophobia and racism but there is still a need for continuing political action. Preventive measures which go hand in hand with encouraging tolerance and combating right-wing extremism are also important considerations here.

Young people from migrant backgrounds are also discriminated against in the compulsory education system with its monolingual orientation. The native language, or language of the country of origin, is often perceived as being a handicap when learning German, rather than as competence (Yiliz 2001).[11] The important role of the school in social positioning and as an empowering factor is emphasised: "It is also in school that decisions are arrived at as to who legitimately belongs to a society and whether he is ‚at the top‘ or ‚at the bottom‘. [...] In the current situation the mono-cultural school system serves the interests of the autochthonous population in preventing immigrant groups from rising within the society" (Hamburger 2001, p. 1219). The fact that there is very little time for support or intervention in a school system which demands that after only four years a decision be made on the type of school to which a child should be sent, is also seen as problematic (PISA 2000, p. 37).

Young people in the member states of the EU were asked, within the framework of the Eurobarometer 47.2 (1997), about their attitude to foreigners. 40 % of the young people interviewed in Germany said they agreed with the statement: "Es gibt zu viele (Fremde)" ("There are too many" foreigners) (Eurobarometer 47.2 1997, p. 35). One factor that strongly influences the orientation toward foreigners is the level of education : "In other words, the higher their level of education, the less threatened people felt by the presence of foreigners." (Eurobarometer 47.2 1997, p. 37).

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[10] On the subject of individualisation and pluralisation in life situations cf. Beck (1996).

[11] Besides competence in two or more languages, there can also be cases in which only a low level of competence in both the language of the country of origin and the host country language is to be found. The DJI project group "multi-cultural children's lives" which interviewed children between the ages of 5 and 11 recommends not concentrating one-sidedly on language problems, but rather recognising the child's multi-lingual ability as competence. (DJI-Projekt "Multikulturelles Kinderleben" 2000b, p. 108).

6. Constitutional protection, policies

The persecution and oppression suffered by many during the time the Nazis were in power in Germany; led to the right of asylum being included as part of the constitution:[12]

"Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of asylum."
Article 16a (1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany

Since the constitutional amendment of 1.7.1993, a new asylum law has been in operation, which permits asylum seekers to be refused entry at the border to the Republic of Germany. (A person entering the Republic from a member state of the EU or a third state has no right of asylum.) Since then the number of officially registered refugees has decreased, that of illegal immigrants has increased. At the same time another article of the Constitution is intended to guarantee equality before the law and protection from discrimination.

It has been remarked that the concept of integration[13] is often reduced to expecting migrants and refugees to adapt themselves to the host society and be assimilated. The political, legal and economic dimensions (equal treatment and participation) are ignored (cf. Marvakis 1998). Economic and structural differences are frequently ‚culturalised', i.e. they are interpreted as cultural differences or peculiarities. Within the framework of education there is also a danger of encouraging this culturalisation process through using simplifying attributes (e.g. "the Turkish frequenter of a youth centre"). It is important to see integration as a process in which both immigrants and inhabitants of the host country are involved. The role of the state must, among other things, lie in preparing its citizens for plurality and foreignness (keyword, 'foreignness competency'). Held (1999) pointed out that, in the context of integration, opposing forces in the form of exclusion processes have to be taken into consideration.

Learning the German language is considered an important factor in integration, in particular by the government.[14] German courses especially for allochthons are encouraged and sponsored by the state. Esser describes the "outstanding importance of language competence" in the process of integrating minorities and migrants as one of the "most stable results of empirical integration research" (Esser 1999, p. 30; on the subject of multilingualism cf. the DJI project "Multicultural Children's Lives" 1999a and 2000b). For school children in particular, insufficient competence in the German language can hinder them in their educational career (cf. PISA 2000, p. 37). The new law on citizenship (brought into effect in 2000) states that children born in Germany have the right to citizenship, providing that one or

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[12] *The United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Geneva Convention on Refugees (1951) are also significant in this context.*
[13] In discourses on migration and foreignness the ambiguous and variously understood term "integration" is used, as well as the equally the open concept "multi-culturalism"/"muti-cultural society".
[14] The Social Democratic Party (SPD) together with the Green Party (Bündnis '90/die Grünen) formed a coalition government which has been in power since 1998.

other parent has been living in Germany for a minimum of eight years. Both passports can be retained up to the age of 23, at which point the holder must decide which citizenship he/she wishes to have in future (Schatz & Nieland 1999, p. 11).

7. Other information/methodology

"Germany needs male and female immigrants."
(Independent Commission on "Immigration" 2001, p. 1)

The question has been raised, in connection with the stagnating population in Germany and the increasingly large proportion of older people, to what extent migration might be able to balance out these undesirable demographic developments. In discussing immigration a difference is drawn, especially in connection with political questions regarding the labour market, between "useful" migrants (skilled/qualified workers) and "less useful" migrants.[15].

Eckard (2000) points out the following methodological problems that can occur when carrying out research into and with people from migrant backgrounds (especially in representative surveys):

There is no statistically reliable data on the migrant population in Germany (ibid., p. 265).

Using the non-German sounding names in the telephone book as an information source can only be a help-out (many German citizens have non-German sounding names, many people who do not have German citizenship have names which sound German) (ibid. p.266).

Language problems in surveys/interviews require the help of translators, which can be costly (not all the interviewees speak German, only a few of the interviewers speak the relevant foreign languages) (ibid.).

Communication norms, determined by culture, can make surveys/interviews problematic (ibid.).

The advertising industry has not yet shown any interest in migrants living in Germany and hence there has not been any incentive to solve methodological problems (ibid., p. 266 ff.).

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[15] The following quote is from a politician who is a member of the Conservative Party (CSU): "We need fewer foreigners who make use of us and more we can make use of ." (Günther Beckstein, CSU) http://www.leitkultur.de/warum.html [Zugriffsdatum 11.1.2002]s

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CHILDREN AND MIGRATION: GREECE

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1 Introduction

One year after the last national population census (March 2001) official data has still not been published on the population of Greece. 'Temporary' data from the National Statistical Service indicates that 10,939,771 persons were counted in 2001, that is to say approximately 6.6% more than in 1991 (10,259,900). There are few official figures on the existence and numbers of ethno-linguistic and ethno-territorial minorities living in Greece[16].

The national or official language is Greek. It is spoken by 98% of the population. In a survey for the European Year for Languages (2001)[17], 30% of respondents replied positively in a question concerning their spoken knowledge of other 'local dialects and languages' (responses concerned various Greek dialects while 12.1% concerned non Greek languages and dialects such as Turkish, Russian, Albanian, Slavo-macedonian, Vlachica, Italian, Bulgarian etc.). It is important here to underline that such studies do not yet include all social groups and the various languages they speak and understand, but refers only to Greek citizens.
In Greece the age of majority is 18 years.

2. Migration into Greece

2.1 Migrants

The formation of the modern Greek nation state took place over a period of time, stretching from the first third of the 19th Century until after the Second World War – when it took its final territorial form.–This nation formation was undertaken with the continuous addition of various ethno-linguistic populations within its expanding borders (Christopoulos, 2001). The incorporation of various ethno-linguistic populations has thus been a constant feature of the New Greek State from its origins and is not a recent historical phenomenon of the past decades in the 20th century.

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[16] The last census with a relevant question was that of 1951 and immediately prior to this 1928The only census providing analytic questions on the languages spoken by citizens within the Greek state was that of 1920 (*Eleftherotypia*, Supplement, 21/10/2001, 47).
[17] V-PRC Company (September 2001)

As is easily observable from the general population censuses over the past 40 years, Greece has experienced immigration for several decades.

Table 2.1. Contribution of natural increase to the population and of migration flows in the increase in the real increase of the population. (1961-2001)

Decades	Increase in (net) real population	Natural increase	Migration flows
1961-1970	380.088	839.425	-459.337
1971-1980	971.776	637.368	334.408
1981-1990	519.483	272.441	247.042
1991-2000	679.871	21.617	658.254

Source: Drettakis 2001 a.

In contrast to the 1961-1970 period (emigration flows of Greeks, mainly to other European countries) the subsequent three decades showed a net inflow into the population: in 1971-1981 this was due to people of Greek origins repatriating (Diaspora) and Greek migrants from Europe returning. During 1981-1991 this was mainly caused by the repatriation of political refugees, Pontians and other people of Greek origins, as well as migrants from various countries. The decade of 1991-2001 was marked by an increase in the real (net) population of the country by 679,871 persons, virtually all the result of migration.[18] Researchers[19] estimate that the current number of migrants varies between 500,000 and one million persons, that is to say between 5 and 10% of the country's population. Approximately a half of these came from Albania, while the remainder came from a wide range of countries especially in Eastern Europe. Amongst these approximately two out of three are men (Vovou, 2001)[20]. Almost all belong within the category of economic migrants and thus are mainly drawn from younger age groups.

Under Law 356/1997, 371.641 migrants made an application, to obtain a white card for temporary residence. They came from over 120 countries in the world. 9 out of 10 of these came from Eastern Europe, India, Pakistan, Egypt and the Philippines, with 2 out of 3 from Albania (Kavounidi & Hadzaki, 2000). Under a new law (N.2910/2001)[21] –replacing Law 1975/1991, a "second chance" was given to non-registered migrants to regularize their non-legal residence and 360,000 submitted an application within the time deadlines. However the completion of the registration process brought migrants up against often insurmountable problems because of inadequacies in the public administration. Difficulties in legalizing their position means many migrants are

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[18] See also the figures of the births to Greek and Albanian mothers by   M.Drettakis in *Eletherotypia* 24/8/1999.

[19] e.g. Katsoridas, 1994; Linardos-Rulmon, 1993; Mousourou, 1991; Petrinioti, 1993; Psimmenos, 1995; Naxakis & Chletsos, 2001. OECD in its last publication on international migration estimated the number of migrants in Greece between 800,000 and 1 million ("Avghi" 24-25/3/2001).

[20] This is not true for all ethnic groups, such as those from the Philippines where the gender balance is opposite (Canete, 2001)

[21] Which received much severe criticism from the body of NGOs even while it was being prepared and voted on.

non registered and their irregular status brings accompanying problems in their everyday life.

2.2 Refugees.

According to statistics from the Ministry for Public Order on the 31/12/2000 the refugee population in Greece consisted of 6.653 individuals, and a further 407 with temporary residence for humanitarian reasons. On the 31/12/2001[22] refugee numbers were estimated at approximately 7.500 the majority from countries in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey). The educational level of the refugees is mainly secondary school (76%) while about 9% have higher level education. The Table below provides indicative data on the gender and age of refugees in Greece.

There are no figures for the total number of children of asylum seekers and refugees, but the most recent data for those under 20 years of age enrolled in the Multicultural Centres of Greek Council for Refugees (GCR), as well as young people under 18 residing in Reception Centres run by various NGOs, indicate a large percentage of children in the refugee population[23]. Amongst these are unaccompanied minors, usually from Afghanistan.

Table2 2. Gender and Age of Asylum seekers, 2000/2001

Age	Men	%	Women	%
0-25	1433	58	389	64%
25-40	915	37	176	29%
40+	122	5	48	8%
	2470	100	613	100%

Source: Greek Council for Refugees, Ministry for Public Order.

Table 2.3. **Children and young refugees in Greece.**

Age	Boys	Girls	Total
0-5	53	43	96
6-10	58	44	102
11-15	96	62	158
16-20	269	13	282
- 18 (other NGOs)[24]	-	-	297
Total			935

Source: Greek Council for Refugees

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[22] Data are from the Greek Council for Refugees.

[23] There are also other centres attended by refugee children run by the Red Cross and the Institute for Social Work.

[24] The Reception Centre for Refugees and the Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers of the *Doctors without Borders*, Reception and Hospitality Centre for Asylum Seekers and Displaced person of the Hellenic Red Cross, The Centre for Temporary Reception for Political Refugees. This does not include the data for children living outside Athens e.g. in Anoyeia, Crete the only centre for unaccompanied minors has been in operation since 2001 having 25 beds. While a second such centre will start to operate shortly according to the Ministry of Health and Welfare.

Despite the fact that the Ministry of Welfare is the body responsible for the coordination and funding of the Reception Centres, the contribution of the various NGOs in the operation and management of reception centres for refugees is critical though it was inadequate to cover about 2,900 asylum seekers arriving during 2001 (Gianniri, 2001).

3. Special issues

3.1 The children of refugees and migrants

All recognize the existence of special needs and problems amongst children of refugees and migrants. The Greek Council for Refugees started the "Pyxides" centres in 1996 aiming to help with the adjustment of young refugees to Greek society through educational and creative activity programmes. Similar programmes have been started by other NGOs.

A joint programme by the Red Cross in Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as heads of local authorities from the two countries, was developed for 1,520 children (aged 8-13 from areas of Bosnia and Krainas with experience of war) where they had the opportunity of hospitality in foster families throughout Greece and enjoyed other activities providing psychological support. A group in the "Centre for Research and Support for Victims of Maltreatment and Social Exclusion – Ioannina" examined the effects of this activity on the (psychological) health of the 20 children and their foster mothers in Ioannina who participated in the programme. (Bilanakis et.al 1999, Alexiou 1996)[25] In a presentation a colleague of the Centre, Ioannina Babasika (1995) referred to another activity aimed at examining traumatic experiences of torture in the family and the experiences of exile amongst a group of children from Kurdistan. Another group (Papageorgiou et al. 2000) examined the psychological health problems of 96 children being housed in Thessaloniki as a consequence of their specific experiences (e.g. war trauma). Other researchers have also commented on the same problems for refugees in Greece independent of their age (Black, 1994). Another crucial issue is the question of migrant children's physical health (Petridou, E.& Davatoglou, 1997; Purnas et al. 1999).

3.2 Educational issues

Social integration isone of the most discussed subjects concerning children of migrants and refugees. In accordance with current legislation all children between 6 and 15 years of age are obliged to go to school[26] and this also applies to the children of asylum seekers and refugees.

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[25] For further references see the Centre's web page –www.cvme.gr-deafult.html.
[26] Access to technical education presupposes the holding of a residence and work permit.

Drettakis (2001b)[27] gives data on the participation and distribution of repatriated Greeks and foreign pupils of different ages in the various state schools in primary and secondary education for the school years 1995-99. These indicate a clear and steady rise in numbers reaching 5.6% (79,737) of the total population of pupils (1,431,888) in the school year 1998-99.[28] This upward trend has continued and the number of "other" pupils was about 120,000 in 1999-2000 (Frementiti & Liatsou 2000); with schools in Attica having over 60,000 pupils and Thessaloniki about 20,000 pupils.

In some areas and neighborhoods or in specific schools the percentage of pupils not born in the country exceeds the overall 5.6%. Salteris (2001:47), using data from the 43rd Bulletin of the Teachers and Kindergarten Teachers' Association for the school year 1999-2000, notes that "in the area of Kalithea-Moshatoy, the percentage of returnees-foreigners in the Primary schools reaches 15.2%. In a third of all units it exceeds 20% and in one or two it reaches 30%."

In the middle of the 1990s (Law 2413/96) various legislative adjustments were made as an attempt to deal with the special needs of non-local pupils (foreigners, gypsies, Muslims in Thrace), particularly concerning "multicultural education" (Damanakis, 1997) and the operation of "multicultural schools"[29]. One characteristic of this approach is the stress it places on cultural differences and this leads to a greater exclusivity of cultural and linguistic "variety", rather their integration into everyday reality in the primary school.

Schools (and kindergartens) for the children of migrants and refugees are also organized by migrant communities[30] e.g. the Polish community under the auspices of their Embassy[31], the community of Philippinos in Athens (Canete, 2001).

The difficulties faced by children from various groups attending school stems not from legal prohibitions but from bureaucratic barriers which start from the time they try to enrol in school. Markos (1997, 56) summarizes "The children of the Greek Diaspora as well as children from other linguistic and cultural groups living in Greece have to deal with a series of problems concerning school and social integration, during the period of socialization, as well as dealing with the specific school and social reality in Greece."

In qualitative research with Albanian pupils from the 6th grade of primary school and the 1st Gymnasium in Rhodes, Kodakos and Govaris (2001) noted that these pupils experience the school and integration in it, as offering more barriers than possibilities, and often develop personal strategies, such as 'submissive adaptation' to the demands of the school. Pupils experience and

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[27] See also data from Drettakis in vols. 107 (1999) and 113 (2000) in *Syhroni Ekpaidefsi* and in *Eleftherotypia* 31/7/2001.
[28] From 3.1% (47,666) in the general school population (1,531,943) in the school year 1995-1996.
[29] An *Institute for Diaspora and Multicultural Education* is being set up to implement and supervise these programmes.
[30] There are also private initiatives by individuals running nurseries for the children of migrants and refugees some of which are multicultural and others serve mainly one linguistic group.
[31] See *Eleftherotypia* Supplement 24-25/3/20001 and 7/3/1995/

confront problems less as individuals and more as representatives of a national group, that is their experience in the specific school reality is often one of depersonalization.

3.3 The rights of children

The Greek alternative report (complementing the National Report) to the UN from Greek NGOs on the subject of the implementation of children's rights in Greece, stressed a series of important points:[32]

o It characterized as problematic the implementation of special measures to protect refugee unaccompanied minors

o It stressed the lack of real access of refugees/ migrants to education (such as the 'multicultural schools') because of administrative barriers such as the absence of essential certificates.

o It notes the presence of a large number of children of migrants, refugees and minorities who are forced to work and others who fall victims to sexual exploitation.

The absence of protection for the children of migrants/refugee means they are vulnerable to exploitation by adults, both individuals and (organized) groups– even to the point of children being kidnapped[33] from their country so they can be brought to Greece and earn a daily wage for their exploiters[34], sometimes risking their lives.[35]

4. Migrant settlement

4.1 Work

Migrants in Greece work in agriculture, in the building industry, in workshops and also provide services in the home (cleaning, care of the sick and old) and in the tourist industry. Some of the older and/or more 'successful' have managed to become self employed in small businesses (e.g. small scale selling). They represent a flexible labour force, underemployed or with many jobs in irregular employment and frequently without guaranteed social rights (Ioasafidis, 2001; Markova, 2001; Psimmenos, 2001; Canete, 2001). Psimmenos (2001) stresses that migrants working in Greece are characterised by being temporary, subservient and entrapped. A specific category of workers are approximately 10,000 sex workers (Vovou, 2001), usually women, who work under extreme subordination to their "employers".

4.2 Housing

Migrants/refugees are established in the poorer neighborhoods of urban centres and the countryside, with the dominant criteria being rent levels, though they are not limited to any specific neighborhoods (e.g. industrial) as occurs in other European countries. They may also live at their work place,

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[32] A brief summary was given in *Eleftherotypia* 17/1/2002, page 49.
[33] See *Eleftherotypia* 11/11/1998
[34] See *Nea* 22/1/1994, 12/4/1996, *Eleftherotypia* 22/1/1994 et al..
[35] See *Apogevmatini* 17/8/1997, 2/1/1998.

whether this is a house or a temporary shelter on agricultural land, greenhouses and entertainment centres. There are also migrants who live in the open.

4.3 Coexistence

The various groups of migrants belong to "weak or person centered social networks", a whole world of social relations, attitudes and initiatives parallel to the world of the locals (Marvaki, Pavlou & Parsanoglou 2001a). Some groups of migrants have created a variety of communities and associations – for example there are many Philippine associations (Canete, 2001) while other groups despite their numerical strength e.g. the Albanians, have few organized associations. While their co-existence with most of the Greek population is harmonious[36], most migrant representatives agree that treatment received by foreign migrants from the Greek public services and particularly the police is particularly poor.

4.4 Youth culture.

There is no published data on the experiences, problems, needs and activities of the "other' youths of Greece[37]. Artistic references on the subject can be found: a film from 1988 directed by K.Giannari, produced as a realistic-documentary with mainly amateur actors, showed the life of various groups of youths- children of the Diaspora from Russia who pursue the "Greek dream" in Athens. The 1998 Cannes Festival prize-winning film by Th.Angelopoulos "An Eternity and a day" had as its main hero an unaccompanied migrant minor from Albania. Another short film from 1994 by George Zafeiri shows the adventures of two small Albanian migrants in Greece.

5. Discrimination and racism – policies for migrants

5.1 Legal and Administrative framework

In complete contrast to the data on the existence of migrants and refugees but in accordance with a wider given "myth" in public discourse, Greece was "surprised" in the last 10 years by migrants. Thus it changed, in line with this myth, from being a sending to being a receiving country for migrants. It has also very few migrant policies for its new citizens and needs, above all, an institutional consolidation of the rights of migrants (Georgoulas, 2001). There is also an absence of integration policies.

Other forms of institutional discrimination and racism, are based mainly on the legal framework in turn based on the assumed temporary nature of residence by foreign migrants and refugees. Contributing to this is the fact that citizenship based on "blood" (jus sanguinis). Kourtovik (2001) stresses that

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[36] See the description by 13 migrant and refugee groups in Marvaki, Pavlou & Parsanoglou (2001), as well as the Final Report (1998) of a research programme in Thessaloniki.
[37] See accounts by two youths from Sudan and the Philippines (*Avghi* 11/7/1999. 4-5)

Greek legislation for foreigners and administrative practices – after a period of acceptance (until 1990) and criminalizing foreigners (1990-2000) is now in a phase of criminalizing and expelling migrants. The legal framework, as well as administrative practices force many migrants to live in a state of insecurity and dependence added to which are everyday forms of discrimination and racism such as: difficulties in finding a house to rent; baptism with Greek Christian names by employers ("workers as property"), some employers' refusal to give the wages earned and 'invitations' to the police station.

5.2 Mass Media

The entry and residence of legal and registered migrants in Greece constitutes a central theme in all public dialogue in the country's mass media. The "issue" – that is to say the existence of migrants– is connected through stories of the increase in criminality and other social problems. Research [38] indicates the distorting effects of Greek media and the poisoning of social relations between migrants and locals, which excludes the possibility of creating harmonious and creative relationships between these social groups. News stories contribute to the formation of negative criminal stereotypes for the migrant population (mostly concerning the Albanians).

5.3 Consequences for children

It is difficult for children to benefit from positive steps by the state such as multicultural programmes, when their parents may experience threats of being expelled and live often under insecure conditions that do not permit them to plan their lives. Within this context it is hardly surprising that children – particularly those with parents from Albania – as well as adults, often hide their origins and identity (religion, name) "I am from Ioannina – and not from Albania.)

6. Protection, support

The difficulties for migrants of residence in Greece make them not just passive recipients but also active resistors at different levels and with various objectives (e.g. successful strike by Albanian workers in Magnesia with the aim of improving wages, refugees who have resisted attempts to expel them etc.). Another form of resistance and support is based on the difference between "justice" and "law". One example is the way that some public servants overcome formal requirement as a way of satisfying the needs of migrants e.g. in the public hospitals. Support does not come only from spontaneous and isolated actions by individuals. In recent years a slow but steady increase in the number of NGOs is observable. More generally there have also been initiatives in civil society with the aim of organizing support for migrants (Marvaki, Pavlou & Parsanoglou, 2001).

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[38] On the Athens press see Konstantinidou (1999, 2001), for the Thessaloniki press see Pavlos (2001).

The lack of state infrastructures for migrants and refugees is being filled by initiatives by NGOs. In initiating and running such initiatives an important role is played by funding programmes – usually from the EC. Thus organizations such as the Greek Council for Refugees, Caritas, the Red Cross, Doctors of the World et al. organize sections for the learning of Greek, food rations and clothing, medical and pharmaceutical care and psychological support as well as reception centres, including activities for those newly imprisoned.

7. Methodological observations

Research is partial, poorly supported and highly personalized without adequate scientific evidence and often polemical. Statistics are unreliable and should be read as indicative. Often data is entirely missing and one has to rely on personal accounts, knowledge and observation, while examining the daily press which often publish "research" on the attitudes of natives towards migrants. Migrants and refugees appear as the objects of discourse and less as the subjects. This applies to both public debate and scientific work.

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CHILDREN AND MIGRATION: ITALY

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1. Introduction

Italy has a total population of 57.8 million inhabitants. While most are Italian-speaking, there are small bi-lingual border provinces where the population includes French-speakers (Val d'Aosta), German-speakers (South Tyrol), or Slovenian-speakers (Gorizia). The age of majority is 18. The Italian school system is divided into maternal, elementary, lower middle and upper middle school (also called secondary school). At age 14 young people choose what kind of secondary school they attend (classical, technical, etc.). It is compulsory from elementary school through age 16, for a total of 11 years, up from 9 years in 1997.

2. Migration

Italian statistics consider "foreigners", and occasionally "foreign-born". In public discourse "immigrant" is elided with "foreigner", and Italian-born children of foreign parents, who do not have citizenship, are considered "foreigners". While the census asks about place of birth, all other data are based on nationality: residence permits, municipal registries, school enrolment, and so on.

Until the 1970's, Italy was almost exclusively a country of emigration, as well as massive internal movement. Starting in the mid-70's, and increasing exponentially in the '90s, it has become a receiving country. The Italian labour market is highly fragmented, comprising many small and medium enterprises, with a high level of "underground" activity, so no organised labour migration was managed. Initially, the inflow involved specific sectors of the labour market, genders and nationalities: Cape Verdean and Filipina women in domestic services; North African men in agriculture and, less extensively, industry; Senegalese men in street vending and some industry. As the Italian population grew richer and aged, and as the willingness of southerners to migrate north declined, foreign workers began to occupy more important roles in the labour market of the industrial north, especially the north-east, where most of the recent growth has been centred. After a few years, these workers bring their families.

By now, about 150,000 enter annually and the number of immigrants has reached 1.5 million. Most of the immigrants are in Italy for work (850,000). Another 520,000 are in Italy with family permits, although this does not preclude labour force participation. There are 55,000 "religious" immigrants, mostly in and around the Vatican in Rome. Another 45,000 are wealthy foreigners who have chosen to live in Italy, and a further 35,000 are foreign students.

In terms of nationality, the population is highly heterogeneous, with no group making up more than 15% of the total. In the 1990's, Albanians started to arrive in large numbers, reaching 163,868 registered residents in 2000, the second group after Moroccans (194,617) and other Maghrebians (73,000). Other East European groups increased rapidly as well: there are more than 126,000 from the former Yugoslavian countries and more than 68,000 Romanians. In the latter half of the '90s, the population from South Asia almost doubled, reaching more than 100,000 from Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The resident Chinese population also boomed, reaching more than 60,000, just under the stable Filipino population of 72,000. Africans have come mainly from Senegal (40,000), Ghana (25,000), and Nigeria (21,000). The South American population is led by rapidly increasing Peru (32,000) and Ecuador (11,000), and by the Dominican Republic (11,500) and Columbia (10,000). The population of EU citizens has been stable at about 150,000 immigrants for the past decade, and there are also numerous US (50,000) and Swiss (18,000) citizens. The foreign population is young compared to the Italian population. Most are working-age.

There are at least 280,000 under 18, and most of these are young children; there are few foreign adolescents. Of the adult population, about 71% are between 19 and 40 and 22% between 41 and 60 years old. This contrasts sharply with the Italian population. In fact, the boom in the Italian birth rate took place in the mid-60's and there are now half as many Italians in the 0-5 bracket as the 35-40 bracket. The number of foreign children born in 2000 was 25,916, almost 5% of total births. Taking into account mixed couples – almost 10% of marriages in Italy involve at least one foreigner – another 5% of all newborns have at least one foreign parent.

3. Special Issues

There were 7,823 "unaccompanied minors" in Italy at the end of 2001. Most (42%) are 17 years old; most (86%) are boys. The main countries of origin are Albania (50.8%), Morocco (17.4%) and Romania (8%). Half are in just three regions: Lombardy (mostly in Milan), Lazio (Rome) and Apulia (the south-east coastal region, where Albanians are most likely to land). These adolescents represent €250m/year in expenses for Italy, which houses and takes care of them. Yet 1,763 had run away from the dormitories or centres set up for them, perhaps because they feared repatriation upon turning 18. Many have family networks in Italy, either second-degree relatives who cannot bring them under current family reunification law or close relatives who are illegally present in Italy.

There is a large number of undocumented immigrants, more than 250,000, who work in the irregular economy. Although it is very difficult for these people to bring their families, there are some children whose parents do not have documents. There is a general expectation that sooner or later there will be another regularisation (there have been 4 large amnesties in 16 years).

Asylum seekers have not been a major component of immigrant inflows to Italy. Only in the late '90s did significant numbers of foreigners seek asylum in Italy, and most appeared to drift off to Northern Europe before their case was decided. There is evidence, however, that many of today's asylum seekers – perhaps a third of the 24,000 applicants in 2000 – are remaining in Italy, usually without documents.

4. Settlement

The large-scale immigration phenomena is relatively new. In the past, many immigrants were domestic workers or agricultural workers who lived at their workplace and did not have their family with them. Only in recent years have entire foreign families moved to Italy, and therefore the phenomenon of settlement is a novel one.

Residential concentration is very new. Home ownership is negligible (2.5-5%) compared to Italians (70%). The rigidity of the Italian housing market makes urban evolution a slow process and forces a dispersion among newcomers; nonetheless, some cities and towns have seen very recent phenomena of urban concentration (measured as the percentage of non-citizens in a single subdivision). While these neighbourhoods have become synonomous with urban decay and conflict in Italian popular consciousness, there is still no evidence of "ghettoisation". Studies have looked at children's health (Diku 1999, Bona 1998), but have been fairly limited, and have found that foreign children have more health problems.

The education system has given signs of responding to the changing composition of its student body: since 1990, much pedagogical work has been done and many thematic reforms launched. Because of the increasing autonomy granted to local schools, the effect of these reforms varies. Nonetheless, there is extensive research on teaching Italian as a second language and on how to introduce intercultural (or multicultural) themes in the classroom. There are also many manuals, training courses, and support material. Training teachers to recognise foreign children as full citizens appears to be much slower however, despite the theoretical support available.

There are no schools for the new immigrant populations; foreign-language schools are for elite foreign communities. Nonetheless, after-school initiatives and other "native-culture" educational initiatives are appearing, but little is known of their effects. The foreign school population has doubled in the past three years, and there is evidence that Italian-language schooling has been

struggling to keep up with this. There are some "good practice" areas but overall the arrival of large numbers of non-Italian speaking students is a cause for crisis. The Ministry guidelines – limiting the number of non-native Italian speakers in single classes – have been difficult to apply in some areas where many, or even a majority, of the students are from immigrant families. Preliminary evidence shows that foreign children perform worse in schools than their Italian counterparts, although whether this is due to harsher grading, to limited language skills, or to inappropriate placement has not yet been studied. Limited studies with teachers show that they are slow to change practices to accept foreign children (Cicardi, 1994). Textbooks are still often inappropriate for a classroom of children from heterogeneous cultures (Falteri, 1993). There is some evidence that foreign young people are more likely to choose technical secondary schools than their Italian peers, although the motivations for this choice – whether channelled or chosen – have not been sufficiently explored.

The low number of foreign-born or non-citizen teenagers makes it difficult to talk about youth culture among this population, at the same time as it has limited potential delinquency. There is some research among these young people but so far there have not been any results. The fertility rates of young women in immigrant families, from the limited data available, appear to be much lower than in their countries of origin and only slightly higher than their Italian peers, although more research must be done.

5. Racism and Discrimination

A third of immigrants report having suffered "acts of racism", although no data is available for children. There are no major studies on discrimination and children, although there are some public opinion surveys of perception of children, and on "levels of acceptance" among children.

The 1998 Immigration law addresses the issue of discrimination in art. 44, stating that cases of reported discrimination for "racial, ethnic, national or religious motives" should be "corrected" and the injured party has a right to damages, but does not impose punitive awards (fines). The burden of proof is, however, on the injured party. The disparity in qualitative conditions – language skills and recognition of qualifications – between foreigners and Italy is still such that it is difficult to demonstrate that discrimination is based on one of the four cited factors and not based on other "acceptable" criteria such as language skills. Nonetheless, constitutional barriers to the vote and to access to public employment remain, and cannot be changed without changes to the constitution itself. At the same time, discrimination against foreigners is widespread elsewhere in the labour market and in the media. The segmentation of the Italian labour market and the entry of immigrants into low-status jobs has meant that some jobs have become "jobs for immigrants", while higher status jobs are difficult to obtain in general and require substantial Italian social and knowledge capital.

Racist and anti-immigrant violence is not a widespread phenomenon, and the most recent riot was almost a decade ago, between African agricultural workers and police on the outskirts of Naples. Turin is another crisis point – occasional clashes between police and young men take place – but here, too, social mediation has made some progress. Other sporadic cases of violence are reported, but do not seem to be a major threat. No research has been done in this area.

What is more common is a widespread perception of immigrants as criminals and carriers of social ills, reinforced by the media and exploited by some political parties. The media tends to portray foreigners – indistinguishable from immigrants – as criminals or as very poor people, and Italians consider immigration to be a threat, according to opinion surveys (80% of Italians think there are too many immigrants; 48.5% think that immigrants carry disease; 21% state that immigrants bring crime to their neighbourhood). This is reinforced by the media, which, devotes 56.7% of its representation of immigrants to topics concerning criminality or illegal activity. In fact, TV news cover immigrants almost exclusively as crime cases (90.8%). This is especially true for young immigrants (96.1%).

These sentiments have been exploited by a number of political parties, especially by the National Alliance (post-fascists) and above all by the xenophobic Northern League. The former party would like to impose rigid conditions for entry in Italy; the second would like to have either no immigration or, at most, a labour migration system as once used in Germany. This is reflected in the proposed immigration law (2002), which would limit access to Italy and stiffen penalties for undocumented migration.

The overall effect on children is to create a climate of instability and insecurity, in which their administrative and social future is cast in doubt. This precariousness seems to put them at risk according to a number of parameters. However, there is no empirical research on long-term effects.

6. Constitutional protection, Policies

Italy has signed the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which has been largely incorporated into national law. Children can therefore not be expelled from Italy without their parents. Likewise, they have full access to education regardless of their legal status. The constitution guarantees the right to religious expression. A number of laws deal with the "engulfed" linguistic and territorial minorities. The 1998 immigration law explicitly guarantees "respect and protection of the language and culture of origin" for foreigners. There is a little-known and little-exercised right to translation of many official documents into the native language of the foreigner.

Italy is not an officially multicultural country, nor is its policy regarding immigrant cultures well-defined. Much talk of "integration" was made under the centre-left government, which drew attention to the citizenship law and the hurdles it imposes. In order to "guarantee representation" to non-citizens and

immigrants a number of bodies have been created, and some immigrants have been drawn into the Italian system of social parties (trade unions and associations). Experiments with non-voting city councillors and local "immigrant" elections have been held. There is no evidence that these structures are representative of the local immigrant population. The result has been a large number of consultative bodies of varying weight.

The periodic regularizations – starting in 1982 – have affected more than a million foreigners. The most recent regularisations – launched in 1995 and 1998 – each saw about 250,000 foreigners receive permits. Almost all of these permits were for work; a small fraction were for family reasons, of which there were relatively few minors, fewer than 1,000. While governments on both left and right have sworn not to offer new amnesties, there is currently a mini-regularisation being debated; this would affect only domestic workers, and perhaps only those providing assistance to the disabled.

Citizenship is difficult to obtain: of the 10,000 annual cases of concession of citizenship, 90% are for marriage and only 10% after the 10-year residence period and an application. Further, the rights guaranteed to foreigners – respect of the language and culture of origin – are not officially extended to Italian citizens, regardless of their family's provenance. Ex-foreigners are not officially counted.There are no positive discrimination initiatives.

7. Other information/methodology

Most Italian research has been done through opinion surveys (telephone or in-person) and interviews with children and families. These have mostly not been academic research projects. Many have been conducted by organisations such as the Renter's Union (housing issues), trade unions (work issues) and government bodies (perception and opinion). There are some areas where work has been done directly with young people in schools (Besozzi 1999), though many are unpublished university theses. Other sociological studies have been based on interviews within single immigrant groups, or families (Saint-Blancat 1998, Ceccagno 1998). Much pedagogical material has been produced, for both L2 teaching and interculture, but it has mostly been based on international research and the experience of single teachers (e.g., Favaro 1993, Demetrio 1992). Media use by immigrants has also been superficially examined (Mauri 1999).

Statistical observation has been constrained by the classification system (which considers only nationality) and by the limited data collected (often school performance can not be cross-checked with nationality).

The appearance of significant numbers of children of immigrant origin in Italy is so new that there has been no chance to conduct longitudinal studies, nor to look at outcomes over a long period of time.

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CHILDREN AND MIGRATION:
THE NETHERLANDS

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1. Introduction

At the end of 1990 the population of the Netherlands was about 15 million. By the beginning of 2001 the population had risen to 16 million. Ethnic migrants constitute 9 percent of the total Dutch population. They are divided into 'non-western' migrants whose number has increased to 1,5 million people in 2001 and 'western' migrants increasing to 1,4 million people. Non-western migrants are people from Turkey, Africa, Latin America and Asia with the exception of Japan and Indonesia. The second generation is also divided into western and non-western migrants, depending on the mother's native country, unless that is the Netherlands, in which case the father's native country is the determining factor. Migrants from Western Europe are those from Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Greece, America and Japan. These migrants are highly qualified and mostly older than those of the non-western migrant group. Non-western migrants form a young population group of which 40 percent is younger than 20 years. Of the second generation 80 percent is younger than 20 years. Of the 1,5 million migrants 40 percent is from the two main migrant groups, Turks and Surinamese. The people of Turkey form the biggest group with 320.000 people followed by the Surinam with 309.000. For the people from Morocco the second generation is rapidly increasing because of the high birth rate, the average number is 3,3 children per woman. Other fast-growing groups are Iraqis, Iranians and Afghans. For the next period it is assumed that the group of asylum seekers from Asia will increase by 60 percent. Compulsory schooling is from 4 to 16 years old and continues on a part-time basis to 18 years. This means 12 years of fulltime compulsory schooling and two years of part-time schooling from 16 to 18 years.

2. Migration

Shortly after the Second World War many Italians came to the Netherlands to work in the mining and steel industries. A larger group of about 300.000 repatriates who had Dutch nationality came during the period 1945 – 1958 from Indonesia. In 1951 a group of Moluccan people (about 12.000) came, mostly soldiers of the former Dutch army in Indonesia. Indonesia was a former

Dutch colony, like Surinam, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba. They all came during the seventies, as did many migrant workers from Spain, Portugal, Greece, former Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Morocco. Migrants from Western Europe came during the middle seventies till 1980, mostly due to settlement of foreign industries and because of a demand for highly qualified personnel in companies and universities.

Since1980, the Dutch government has been pursuing an integration policy. For that purpose a new immigration law ('the Aliens Act 2000') has been implemented and a policy plan set up named "Get a Chance and Take that Chance" ('*Kansen krijgen, Kansen nemen'*) with a focus on integration. Since 1998 the government has had a special Minister for Integration. By now the government has achieved its targets: the unemployment rate was four times higher before and with targeted activities the percentage is now 10 percent.

The integration policy focuses on newcomers and budgeted by the government in 2002 for an amount of Euro 136 million. For this policy there is a special Task Force that is responsible for implementation and for special measures in the four big cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Almost 80 percent of migrants are living in these towns. The Aliens Act of 2000 was implemented in 2001 with strict conditions regarding family reunification and starting a family. As a result of sharpening the integration policy the government is now asking for a fee for requesting admission for family reunification and for marriages with people from the native countries.

The effects of this policy are that immigration and the integration process are now better managed. The government maintains its restrictive admission policy and will co-ordinate and harmonise with European Law. A newcomer is considered a migrant when s/he enters the country for the first time under the Aliens Act and if he is an adult. This person is obliged to follow an integration procedure. The main groups of 'newcomers' are from Vietnam, Ethiopia/ Eritrea, Iran, Somalia and Afghanistan. These asylum seekers are well educated and have lived in cities within their native countries, in contrast to the labour migrants in the early seventies who mostly came from rural areas. Still more people are coming to the Netherlands as asylum seekers, for family reunification or for the labour market: almost 40.000 people each year.

Since the 11th of September 2001 there has been an increased focus on immigration and integration issues. The discussion about migration and integration has become more confrontational than before. The social climate, the effects of the attacks on the U.S., the issue of the acquisition of the Dutch language, and also the great number of migrants involved in crime are also a cause of this situation. Participation and interaction of all citizens and population groups and the accessibility of institutions has become a major priority, not only with regard to migrants.

On the national level the government has a consultative platform of representatives from migrant groups that meets annually. The national government has made agreements with the city councils regarding several aspects of integration policy and gives them financial support.

3. Special Issues

How are unaccompanied minors treated upon arrival in the Netherlands? Unaccompanied minors can ask for asylum in the Netherlands. This asylum request is seen as a normal asylum request. The framework for assessing the application is the same as the framework used for adult asylum seekers. The specific situation of the minor, her/his age and mental development will be taken into account when this application is examined. If the application is rejected, the minor must leave the Netherlands unless return to the country of origin is not possible, unjustifiable or the child is deemed unable to maintain him/herself. Important factors in determining whether an alien is able to maintain himself are:
- age (minors under 16 are not considered to be independent), and
- factors within the personality of the minor (has he already taken care of himself before coming to the Netherlands?).

If the minor cannot maintain him or herself in the country of origin, it will be examined whether there is adequate aid available in the country of origin in conformity with the local standards. If the Minister of Justice finds there is no adequate relief, the unaccompanied minor will be granted a residence permit. This residence permit is given for one year and can be renewed at most twice, but only until the day the minor becomes an adult (18 years). During this procedure and after the minor has been admitted, a worker of the organisation '*Stichting Opbouw'* -a guardianship institution- supervises the minor. The minor also attends school from the beginning of the process. There are three centres where minors are initially received. Then after having obtained a residence permit, it is possible to transfer to a "small-scale housing unit"; about four minors live in such a house under the supervision of a guardianship worker.

4. Settlement

4.1 Distribution of population

The four largest cities are located in the west part of the Netherlands and form the so-called 'Randstad'. This area, which is an eighth of the total country size, contains about 25 percent of the total population. The Randstad differs from the rest of the country in many ways. There is a higher population density, higher unemployment and greater differences between income levels. Housing is generally of poorer quality and smaller. There is more rental accommodation. There is greater ethnic segregation and a concentration of lower income, migrants, youth and singles. Despite several government initiatives there is a steady drift of native Dutch middle classes away from the urban centres to the suburbs. In the last four years, the proportion of non-native Dutch residents moving away from the city has almost doubled, currently at around the 10% mark. The proportions are different when it comes

to migration to the cities. In a number of peak years, the proportion of migration from abroad to the cities was approximately 40%, today representing almost 30% of total migration to the cities. Selective migration is related closely to the functioning of the housing market, and in the distribution of categories of houses amongst the cities and the suburban residential areas. Housing availability in the four large cities is still dominated by cheap, pre-war and small multifamily rented homes, of moderate quality.

Between 1994 and 1998, income segregation increased in each of the four cities. With the exception of Amsterdam, over the last decades, segregation according to ethnicity has not increased. However, if we look at the last five years, there is evidence of a minimal rise in segregation in the cities of Utrecht and Amsterdam. The individual ethnic groups also seem to be increasingly moving to live separately from one another. It seems clear that ethnic segregation is related to income segregation.

Households with middle incomes and the wish to buy are barely able to realise that wish in the cities, and hence move elsewhere. For example, in migration from the cities to the suburban residential areas outside the city, the proportion of the middle classes has increased considerably in comparison with earlier periods. Also in income distribution and the job structure on the labour market, under-representation of the middle groups in urban society can be observed. For quite some time, little importance was attributed to this development. However, due to the scarcity on the labour market, a number of vacancies in the middle segment of the urban job structure are becoming increasingly difficult to fill and the problematic character of this development is becoming visible. The composition of the housing stock is of fundamental importance for the future compositions of the urban population,and this represents a very important policy task for urban government. One of the negative effects related to concentration and segregation is the concentration of criminality. Criminality is more common in the four largest cities in the Netherlands than in the remainder of the country.

4.2 Developments and Consequences Regarding Segregation

 The consequences of increasing segregation are clear. There are increasing numbers of black schools many of which obtain increased government funding. Some black schools achieve better than the national average results but others perform poorly. A disadvantage is that these schools might be a hindrance to learning Dutch, which is an important requirement for successful schooling and for climbing the social ladder. There is a need for special pre school language provision in some areas. In many areas the native population is ageing and the numbers of migrant children and youth are growing. There is little communication between these groups. The number of criminal groups in areas where the youth is mainly from Moroccan and Antilles backgrounds is rising. Research in this area has not yet been formulated but the perception is that these groups are causing trouble and are often seen as one of the reasons for the rise in feelings of insecurity.

Generally, the living conditions in migrant neighbourhoods is relatively poor. There is a concentration of social problems such as less than average income, many removals, bad quality of housing, crime and insecurity. The majority of migrants prefer to live in mixed areas with a balance between immigrants and the native population. If their income is above average then they will move to better areas or neighbourhoods. However, there is a trend among asylum seekers, once they receive residence status, to move to a town in the region close to their family or relatives. This is especially the case with Somalis. More than 30 percent of the people from Morocco, Turkey and Surinam live in neighbourhoods with a concentration of 30 percent immigrants.

The second generation nowadays lives better than their parents did. This improvement is due to urban renewals, active housing corporations, more individual use of rent rebate. They are more likely to live in a one-family house and/or private property. The difference is most apparent among people from the Dutch Antilles, after that among the Surinamese and then the Moroccans. However, compared with native Dutch people they are still disadvantaged. According to the research "Perspectives on Housing" done by the housing associations in 1998 migrants want to suburbanise as much as the native households. The conclusion of this research was that the concentration of non-western migrants in neighbourhoods near the city would decline when this group has sufficient opportunities to realise their needs for housing.

5. Racism and Discrimination

The Dutch like their image as a tolerant and pragmatic people. But as the number of immigrants increases year by year, the Dutch are put to the test. Having formed a busy multiethnic and multinational society it is no wonder that the Dutch are looking for a new national symbol to replace tulips and clogs. It should be something that symbolises our tolerance, they argue. But only last year a sociologist published her doctorate showing that when it comes to foreigners the Dutch are not quite as tolerant as it seems. The study revealed that almost half the population is prejudiced against foreigners who in 1999 accounted for 17.1 per cent of the population. While the proportion of foreigners continues to increase, the result is a clear marker that the attitude towards them has changed over the last 10-15 years. An annual report on discrimination in Holland published in 1999 states that "The presence of foreigners in the Netherlands does not constitute a problem per se. But as soon as people realise that this presence might affect their wallet or their neighbourhood, things begin to change," it says in the discrimination-report that also states that the so-called NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) effect is present in Holland.

During the 80s it was taboo to talk about the problems immigration caused and cultural differences were generally accepted and encouraged through an emphasis on lessons in the first language. In the 90s, discussing the problems became increasingly common and acceptable. Instead of stressing

multicultural aspects, assimilation became the guiding principle and newcomers now have to take mandatory lessons in Dutch language and culture.

Combating racism, discrimination, ethnic divisions and multicultural miscommunication touches a nerve in Dutch society. Society has to learn to deal with diversity. Nevertheless, anti-racism is not a central focus of the political and social debate. If anything, the fight against racism is relegated to the fringes of the political and social arena, both nationally and locally. Other items take precedence on the agenda. More difficult yet than interpreting the quantitative data that are available is making a pronouncement about the short-term and long-term trends and the future.

5.1 Employment

The labour market is one of the areas where discrimination often occurs. Though the unemployment rate among immigrants follows the downward trend of the nation wide rate, unemployment is four times as common among the newcomers according to Senior Researcher Philip Muus at the European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER).

To ease foreigners' entry to the labour market politicians have come up with different initiatives. In 1998 parliament adopted the SAMEN law. The aim of SAMEN (the Dutch word for together) is to encourage employers to take in more ethnic minorities at their work place. Every year employers must report on the number of employees from ethnic minorities and the measures the company will take to ensure their representation. However, there are no sanctions attached to the law. At the racism reporting office the SAMEN law was warmly welcomed - but the actual outcome has been very disappointing. But where legislation has failed, a prosperous economy has taken over. It seems that when there is less tension in the labour market and - as they then feel less threatened by immigration - negative attitudes among the Dutch decreases.

5.2 Education

There are two trends that at first glance may seem contradictory. There is concern about the quality of education, the status and appeal of the teaching profession and lack of financial resources to maintain schools, etc. On the other hand, sentiments about the importance of education for children and the future society are being heard more vocally, and important nurturing tasks are being shifted to education. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of the pedagogic and social aspects of this debate. It is fitting here, though, to underscore the importance of good education in the interests of eliminating educational deficits and achieving the aims mentioned below.

5.3 Intercultural Education

Intercultural education is understood to mean all the activities of education aimed at improving relations between people from different ethnic groups,

based on equality. Achieving intercultural education often requires changes at schools. However, some people feel that there are not enough people with the required expertise. The challenge for today is to spread that expertise. A new development is that Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (Association of Netherlands Municipalities, or VNG) included intercultural education on the agenda of their consultation with the heads of the city education departments. Also, VNG was a co-organiser of a round table conference on ethnic desegregation and combating the development of black schools.

5.4 Anti-racism Education and Problematic Areas

Anti-racism education is a composite of activities conducted at schools, in and out of classrooms, aiming to combat prejudice and ethnic clashes. There have been several initiatives in this area, for example, the Schools without Racism project (SWR) has been operating since 1999. There are now 84 senior, general and intermediate vocational schools registered as SWR schools. Twenty organisations serve as local/regional support centres. SWR for primary education started in September 2001. However, anti-racism education and intercultural education have encountered several problems. Workers in this area find that many schools and teachers are afraid that it will place an extra burden on education. They see these educational approaches as extraneous to teaching practices, student counselling and school administration. They have not heard the message that these educational approaches are part and parcel of educational quality. Schools are often more willing to do 'something with multicultural society' rather than racism and discrimination. These concepts evoke too many negative associations. Unfortunately, at many teaching academies, diversity is hardly addressed at all, with barely any structural attention paid to the matter. With a view to the longer term, investments will be required in this area.

5.5 'Black and White Schools'

The debates on black and white schools, originating in the eighties, reappeared in 1998, and again in 2000 when several mothers of Turkish origin from Deventer demanded that their children should be placed in a different school. They had serious doubts about the quality of education that the black school was offering their children. Desegregation was suggested as a means of combating segregation in schools. Projects in which children were voluntarily transferred to different schools (mandatory desegregation is prohibited by law), did not yield the desired results in any municipality. In the Randstad metropolitan area, desegregation is an entirely outdated option, given the demographic figures. The idea of desegregation also clashes with the freedom of education our country holds high. This is a freedom that only a limited circle of Dutch people would like to see compromised.

Given the legal restrictions, failed projects and demographic trends, the question remains as to whether we can and should combat segregation of schools. On the other hand, it has been observed that black schools tend to do more poorly than white ones. This finding was further reinforced when the school inspector assessed black schools more poorly than white ones. This

discrepancy alone does not signify that black schools provide lower quality. But it cannot be denied that the inspector's findings served to obscure the issue.

5.6 Complaints Filed with Anti-Discrimination Bureaux (ADBs)

The ADBs identify an increase in complaints in the allocation of housing. The opinion on this is that 'besides the labour market, the allocation of housing is perhaps an eminent example of a realm where sore points present themselves in the transition to a multiethnic, diverse society'.

Various ADB's have undertaken activities in recent years to combat discrimination in the hotel, restaurant, catering and leisure industries. They focus in particular on the admission policy of discotheques. It is of note that media attention generally results in a sharp increase in the number of complaints and reports in this category. Another salient item is that there are quite some regional differences between the number of complaints the ADB's report. Besides purely demographic differences, the 'spearheads' of the relevant ADB's probably play a role. *Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam* (Agency against General and Racial Discrimination, Amsterdam) reports, for example, that the number of complaints concerning the far right have risen dramatically, from 12 complaints in 1999 to 46 in 2000. This can be attributed to the *Nieuwe Nationale Partij* (NNP), the new national party that was founded when its predecessor, *CP '86*, was prohibited. This party has actively spread pamphlets in Amsterdam this past year. Compared to 1999, the number of complaints based on skin colour/origin and creed has remained about the same. Complaints concerning creed relate to Christian and Islamic expressions of religion, such as wearing a headscarf. The number of complaints about anti-Semitism (14 in 1999 and 54 in 2000) has risen sharply in Amsterdam, especially in the last three months of 2000. The *Meldpunt Discriminatie Amsterdam* attributes the increase in anti-Semitism to escalating tension in the Middle East. Many discrimination cases are heard by the *Commissie Gelijke Behandeling* (Committee on Equal Opportunity, or CGB), where a non-binding ruling is issued.

5.7 Racist Violence and Anti-Semitic Incidents

Perpetrators who select their victims or targets on the basis of their ethnic, racial, cultural or national origin commit a racist offence. The police registered 156 such cases in 1999 and 177 in 2000. It should be noted here that under-reporting is a problem: situations are often difficult to assess, not everything is reported and counted, and in some police regions, registration is given inadequate priority. Despite these factors, it seems that racist violence increased in 2000 compared to 1999, but the number of registered incidents has decreased compared to the years prior to 1999. There has been increased turmoil around asylum centres and increasing violence against refugees. In many places where asylum centres (AZCs) were planned, there was turmoil among the citizens. Legal challenges were filed and informational meetings were raucous. Sometimes things went further: slogans were spray-painted or Molotov cocktails thrown. In the autumn, escalating tension

between Israelis and Palestinians in the Middle East engendered disturbances in the Netherlands, as well.

Three aspects seem to be playing a role in the persistence of the anti-Jewish stereotype in the Netherlands. To an extent, these are 'imported ripples' of anti-Semitism among people who feel personally involved in the Arab-Israel conflict and who feel they must yell anti-Semitic slogans at demonstrations. It is also clear that anti-Semitic statements remain popular among people of a splinter far-right bent. A third element playing a role is that anti-Semitic statements are made in order to be provocative. (In the Netherlands, the dominant paradigm is that anti-Semitism and racism are offensive. People who want to fight against the 'establishment' for whatever reason feel that by making anti-Semitic and racist statements, they are touching a social nerve.)

5.8 The Far Right

The total membership of the various right-wing groups in the Netherlands is very small, the estimated number of members is 660. Of the various right-wing parties that exist in the Netherlands, the *Nieuwe Nationale Partij* (New National Party) made the most active effort to fill the vacuum left behind by the disappearing of the *Centrum Democrate* (party from the Lower House of Parliament in 1999). The New National Party was founded in October 1998 and provides refuge for many of the mouthpieces from the banned *Centrumpartij '96*. Another right-wing organisation that took an active stance was *Voorpost* (Front Post), not a political party but a movement disseminating right-wing ideas on immigration, free trade and nationalism without having ambitions in the arena of party politics. A comparable organisation is *Landelijk Actieplatform voor Nationalistische Studenten* (National Action Platform for Nationalist Students, or LANS). In 2000, *Nederlands Blok* (Dutch Block) lost its only seat on the municipal council during interim elections in Utrecht. That means that the right wing factions have all but disappeared from municipal politics in the Netherlands. The only place where someone is representing the far right in a municipal council is Schiedam.

5.9 Racism on the Internet

The annual report of *Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet* (MDI) indicates that the number of reports of discrimination on the Internet has risen. In 1999, there were just 181 complaints; in 2000 the number had climbed to 550. MDI not only registers racism; it also takes action. A request to remove the statements was made in 218 of the cases, resulting in removal of 194 statements. It is very encouraging that MDI is succeeding in having so many statements removed from the web by taking an active stance. It helps that the rules and values that apply to the 'old' media are becoming the norm for the 'new' electronic media when it comes to the Dutch portion of the Internet. During the course of 2000, MDI notified the Internet provider in 114 cases of racism. An important cause of the increase in the number of reports is that more and more people are going on-line. The notoriety of MDI is also increasing and the *Meldpunt* is more often mentioned on the Internet and in the press.

The increasing number of statements may also be an indication of a deteriorating climate vis-à-vis refugees and migrants and an increase in the use of the Internet by ultra-far right factions. During the European Conference against Racism organised by the Council of Europe, Minister Van Boxtel called for international legislation to combat racism on the Internet.

6. Constitutional Protection and Policies

6.1 Constitutional Protection of Minority Rights

In the Dutch constitution there is no specific minority rights protection. However, there are rights included such as e.g. article 1, the non-discrimination clause. This article is valid for everyone in the Netherlands, not just Dutch people. The same applies to articles 6 and 7 which apply to freedom of religion and philosophy of life and freedom of speech.

6.2   Naturalisation and Citizenship

An alien can become naturalised as a Dutch citizen and remain resident in the Netherlands for an unlimited period. From that point onwards, a person also has the same rights and obligations as any other Dutch person. In order to obtain Dutch nationality, a number of conditions must be met. The main ones are that the person has:
- lived for at least five years in the Netherlands, the Dutch Antilles, or Aruba immediately prior to the application for naturalisation,
- lived for at least three years in the Netherlands with the same Dutch partner, or
- been married and living together for at least three years with the same Dutch partner

There are also other conditions which include that:
- s/he is socially integrated - for example able to hold a conversation in Dutch about everyday subjects;
- s/he does not present a danger to public order, public decency, public health, or to national security
- s/he is prepared to give up his current nationality.

If someone becomes naturalised, all under-age children will also become naturalised. There are, however, exceptions. Underage children are only naturalised as well if they live in the Netherlands and have a valid residence permit.

6.3 Regularisation of Undocumented Migrants

The last regularisation measure was in 1999. It was meant to legalise aliens who had lived and worked in the Netherlands for a long period of time with the help of the government. People who had lived in the Netherlands for at least

six years and were in possession of a tax and social insurance number could make an appeal under this amnesty.

7. Other Information

7.1 family re-unification

The issue of family re-unification has been a difficult one. There have been many cases where it has been difficult to prove family ties under the criteria set out by Dutch immigration law. FORUM and other organisations wrote a memorandum about this issue. We stated that the Dutch policy was contrary to international treaties (ECHR, ITCR), other European countries and the Dutch integration policy. After this memorandum the Secretary of State drew up a policy document in which she stated that family reunification is possible without an actual family tie- check if, within a period of five years after separation between parent and child, the other criteria are met. This is still pending before the Dutch parliament.

Migration Figures of 1 January 2002				
		Absolute		
Sending Countries	*Year*	*$1^e + 2^e$ generation*	*1^e generation*	*2^e generation*
Migrants Total	**1996**	2 498 725	1 284 120	1 214 615
	1997	2 554 285	1 310 675	1 243 590
	1998	2 620 405	1 345 725	1 274 685
	1999	2 699 235	1 390 145	1 309 100
	2000	2 775 310	1 431 140	1 344 190
	2001	2 870 225	1 488 970	1 381 275
Non-Western Total	**1996**	1 171 115	761 565	409 555
	1997	1 221 120	785 985	435 130
	1998	1 278 450	816 205	462 255
	1999	1 346 040	853 755	492 285
	2000	1 408 770	886 245	522 535
	2001	1 483 175	928 545	554 635
Western Total	**1996**	1 327 610	522 555	805 060
	1997	1 333 165	524 690	808 460
	1998	1 341 955	529 520	812 430
	1999	1 353 195	536 390	816 815
	2000	1 366 540	544 895	821 655
	2001	1 387 050	560 425	826 640
Morocco	**1996**	225 090	140 570	84 515
	1997	232 840	142 535	90 310
	1998	241 980	145 600	96 375
	1999	252 490	149 470	103 020
	2000	262 220	152 540	109 685
	2001	272 750	155 670	117 085

Neth. Antilles and Aruba	**1996**	86 825	55 805	31 020
	1997	88 710	56 365	32 345
	1998	92 105	58 200	33 905
	1999	99 130	63 265	35 860
	2000	107 200	69 265	37 935
	2001	117 090	76 825	40 260
Surinam	**1996**	280 615	179 265	101 350
	1997	285 525	179 870	105 655
	1998	290 465	180 520	109 950
	1999	296 985	182 470	114 520
	2000	302 515	183 250	119 265
	2001	308 825	184 735	124 085
Turkey	**1996**	271 510	167 250	104 270
	1997	279 710	169 030	110 675
	1998	289 780	172 415	117 365
	1999	299 660	175 230	124 430
	2000	308 890	177 755	131 135
	2001	319 600	181 595	138 005

@ National Bureau of Statistics: January 2002

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CHILDREN AND MIGRATION: SWEDEN

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1. Introduction

Sweden's current population is 8.9 million. More than 80 percent live in densely built-up areas. One third of the population resides in the metropolitan areas of the three largest cities: Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. The population is concentrated to the southern part of the country (90 percent). In the north the reindeer-herding Saami are an indigenous ethno-territorial minority (only 17 000). On the border to Finland a Finnish-speaking minority numbers 25 000.

The age of majority is 18 years. Compulsory school starts at the age of 7, although there are plans to start at 6. Compulsory school is 9 years. A majority of all young people continue their education for another two or three years, either in theoretical programmes entitling them to university entrance or vocational programmes aimed at specific skilled professions.

Approximately 1.9 million are minors. Children and young people of foreign origin represent today 24 percent. Of these 460 000 minors, one quarter are born in a foreign country. Three quarters are born in Sweden and have at least one parent who is foreign-born. These children are sometimes referred to as the second generation. The concept of second generation is not used today because it is seen to perpetuate the migrant/migration status of persons who are born in the country. Abandoning the second generation concept has implied that statistics on the educational performances, labour market situation etc. of children of migrants are no longer routinely collected. There is a dilemma involved here. While policies of integration stress the importance of diversity and the contributions to the common good that social and cultural diversity represents, there are at the same time restrictions about what kinds of categories are acceptable. Categories that are officially used in for instance population statistics, the argument runs, will tend to pigeonhole people, thus reinforcing negative stereotypes about them. On the other hand, if researchers refrain from using categories identifying people in terms of background variables such as class, gender, ethnicity, language etc. it will be much harder to analyse social inequality and social exclusion. In spite of what has been said above I will use the concept of second generation, understanding it as *second generation after migration*.

2. Migration

The foreign-born population of Sweden totals just over 1 million (11 percent). These persons have come from a vast range of sending countries. I have grouped them into four categories that represent different stages of immigration. Each stage corresponds to specific migrant categories and types of migration.

1) Refugees from neighbouring Scandinavian and Baltic countries 1940-48
2) Labour immigration from Finland and Southern Europe 1949-71
3) Refugees and family reunification from Third World countries 1972-89
4) Asylum-seekers from South-Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the free movement of professionals within the European Community 1990-

During World War II and immediately after the war Sweden gave asylum to refugees from neighbouring countries. Many of these refugees were in the resistance movement in occupied Denmark and Norway, and came alone. Practically the entire Jewish population of Denmark was rescued across the Sound to Sweden in small vessels. Some 85 000 children were evacuated from Finnish cities to Sweden during the course of the war. Many of these children remained in Sweden after the war, or returned later in life. This was the largest international shipment of children in history. Studies conducted in Sweden and Finland on the situation of the evacuated children later in life show contradictory results. A Finnish study showed that a cross-section of the former evacuees had not suffered psychologically as adults from having been separated from their parents for several years (Räsänen 1990). A Swedish study based on in-depth interviews implied, however, that many evacuees had felt betrayed by their parents and suffered as adults from insecurity and depressiveness (Lagnebro 1992).

Most Nordic refugees returned home after the war. Some Estonians and Latvians moved on to USA but many remained in Sweden. Concentration camp survivors were brought to Sweden at the end of the war for medical treatment and rehabilitation. Those who didn't move on to Israel or USA stayed on. Whereas the Baltic refugees often were entire families comprising of several generations, the concentration camp survivors were individuals who had lost or become separated from their families during the course of the war. Children were very much part of the migratory movements taking place during the war, but rather differently for different groups of refugees.

As Sweden was not drawn into the war itself Swedish industry had a great advantage when Europe was being reconstructed. Swedish machines and tools were in great demand. This led to an economic boom and a demand for labour that could not be satisfied by domestic means. During the 1950s and 1960s manpower was imported from Finland and southern Europe (Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey). Children were involved in the manpower migration because Sweden unlike for instance Germany and Switzerland did not accept a guest-worker solution to the demand for labour. Sweden

encouraged workers to bring their families. This is one reason why educational and language training issues were brought to the fore of policy formulation fairly early on in Sweden. The Finnish migrants compared the constitutional language rights that the Swedish speaking community in Finland enjoyed with their own experiences of non-recognition as far as language rights were concerned. The Association of Finnish migrants was active in making demands for language rights in the education of their children. Since this was the largest migrant organization, and since the Finnish members were an important pressure group in the trade unions, the authorities and the Social Democratic government were sensitive to these demands. In 1972 labour migration from non-Nordic countries was stopped, primarily for economic reasons, although most labour migrants who had settled in Sweden stayed on permanently.

As from 1973 the only gates that opened were to refugees and to close family members (spouses, children that had not reached majority). Immigration thus took on a new form. The overthrow of the democratically elected Allende regime in Chile in 1973 triggered a flow of refugees from Chile to Europe. Events in the Middle East triggered another flow of asylum seekers from Turkey (Syrian Christians and Kurds) and Lebanon (Palestinians and Syrian Christians). The war between Iraq and Iran led to a substantial migration of young people in opposition to the Iranian regime. Although asylum seekers were usually young men, family and children entered into the picture through the family reunification processes that would be initiated once an asylum seeker received his/her residence permit.

Table 5.1: Stocks of <u>foreign-born</u> persons residing in Sweden in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. (Source: Statistics Sweden)

Original and main source	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
Refugee sending countries 1940-48	58 580	60 306	54 027	48 529	48 408
Labour sending countries 1949-71	178 842	338 389	358 921	333 471	293 289
3rd World sending countries 1972-89	2 913	16 789	74 565	226 145	366 373
f Yugoslavia	1 532	33 779	37 982	43 346	131 715
Other OECD countries	58 012	88 322	101 458	138 953	149 931
Total	**299 879**	**537 585**	**626 953**	**790 444**	**1 003 798**

The increasing number of asylum seekers from these regions, and family members who were entitled to reunite in Sweden once one member had received a permanent residence permit, was a source of constant concern to the government. It grew difficult to find accommodation to house the refuges, and the government worried about the increasing costs of the resettlement programmes. Another concern was indications of growing xenophobic and racist reactions among the general public in the mid-1980s. A drastic measure

was taken in 1989 to reduce the intake of refugees by no longer accepting general humanitarian grounds for entitlement to settle. Only refugees in the traditional sense of the Geneva convention would be accepted. One consequence of this change of entrance policy is that accepted refugees and their families more often than before during the 1970s and 1980s suffer from traumatic experiences of war, ethnic cleansing and torture. This measure reduced the flow of non-European migrants temporarily. However, the breakdown of Yugoslavia and the wars that followed displaced hundreds of thousands of persons. Due to the networks that had established earlier between Yugoslavia and Sweden, Sweden became one of the destinations for those who managed to leave the country. By the late 1990s the bulk of the refugee intake had shifted to Iraq.

3. Special issues

The official statistics provide three categories for identifying migrants: country of birth, parent's country of birth and citizenship. Ethnicity, religion and native language are not recorded. The foreign-born are referred to as the first generation of (im)migrants. As mentioned earlier, their children (born in Sweden) were often referred to as the second generation (immigrants). These children are themselves not migrants but descendents of migrants. For labour migrants of the 1960s the generation of their children is now considerably larger than the first generation. For more recent migrant groups, however, the first generation is still the largest. We also need to recognize an *in-between generation* of young people born in another country but who have grown-up in the receiving country. When we speak of children and migration we are not always clear about what children we are actually referring to. Do we mean only those children who themselves have a history of emigration and resettlement in a new society, or do we also include children of migrants? While very young children may hardly be aware of the actual move to a new country of residence, children of school-age will be highly aware of the change of school with new teachers and class-mates, a different curriculum and language of instruction. Children that are born in Sweden with at least one parent who has migrated have other kinds of experience.

How long should one be classified as belonging to the second generation? The cutting-point is arbitrary but somewhere along the line one could identify a *"lateral" generation* consisting of adults with at least one parent who is foreign-born. The content issues of the second generation real become skewed if even adults belonging to this category are included.

Table 5.2: Generations of migrant origin, <u>foreign-born</u> and <u>born in Sweden</u>. Stocks for 2000. Row distribution given in *percent*. (Source: Statistics Sweden)

Origins	Total	Foreign-born			Born in Sweden		
Generation		First	In-between		Second		Lateral
Age		25 -	18-24	0-17	0-17	18-24	25 -
North Europe and Germany with UK	806 941	40	1	1	15	7	35
Main senders: Third World	559 575	46	9	11	29	4	3
Main senders: East Europe	271 986	54	6	9	19	4	8
Others	182 644	52	4	6	11	6	21
Total	1 821 146	815 407	81 064	107 327	355 360	97 884	364 104
		45	4	6	20	5	20

North Europeans (mainly labour migrants arriving in the post-war years up until the 1970s) represent the numerically largest category. A substantial number are first generation migrants, although aging. The second and lateral generations are quite large. Third World migrants arriving since 1972 represent a large first generation, in-between generation and second generation but a small lateral generation. The bulk of the immigration from sending countries in East and Central Europe (Bosnia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia) occurred during the 1980s and 1990s although earlier labour and refugee migration from all four countries is evident.

In the early 1990s unaccompanied minors started to appear, with a peak of more than 1400 children in 1992. Since then the number has dropped to a level of about 200 per year. Countries of origin have mainly been Bosnia, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq and Somalia. The parents to a majority of these children were said to be alive when the children were sent out. A majority of the unaccompanied minors are boys, most of them in their teens. Some were responsible for younger children in their company. One reason why boys are in the majority may be to spare them from being rounded up to serve as child soldiers. An important, but difficult task is to try to identify who the child is. The problem is that many children have been given false identities and faked biographies. The authorities have been at a loss how to deal with these children. Some have relatives in Sweden but this is not true of all children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that Sweden has ratified makes it more difficult to repatriate children than it is to repatriate adults. Recently shocking news has come to public attention that many unaccompanied

minors, placed in special reception centres have been exploited by unscrupulous traffickers for child prostitution. Children have been taken out from the reception centre in the evening for this purpose, and then brought back some hours later without the staff at all being aware of what was going on.

4. Settlement

In a television interview broadcasted by one of the national channels, a young man in his late teens, born in Sweden to immigrant parents, living in Alby, one of Stockholm's segregated suburbs, said that when he took the underground into the city centre he felt he was entering foreign territory. Therefore he seldom left the neighbourhood although the centre of Stockholm with its culturally diversified nightlife attracting many young people is less than half an hour distant from Alby by the underground.

Swedish integration policy is condensed in three slogans: *equality, freedom of choice* and *partnership*. The application of equality was a rejection of the guest worker system. Immigrant workers were to enjoy the same social, educational and economic rights as Swedes. They were permitted to bring their families to Sweden. The idea behind *freedom of choice* is that *individuals* determine their personal cultural affiliation and identity, not collectives, organizations or ethnic groups. This goal was a rejection of forced and uncompromising assimilation of individuals. *Partnership* is about seeing immigrants and minority groups as partners in the development of society. The main instrument to ensure *equality* is general welfare policy in its many facets. Language policies (mother tongue instruction, remedial Swedish, interpreter services) are means to enable *freedom of choice*. The language policies were specifically directed to children of migrants. Extending the franchise to non-Swedish citizens in local elections and facilitating naturalization are means to ensure *partnership*.

Swedish equality policies are strongly focused on women's rights in all domains of social life, providing opportunities for migrant women and girls of the second generation to study, pursue a career and become economically independent. Whereas women tend to gain some independence their male relatives lose in status. Twenty-five years old Fadime Sahindal was recently murdered by her Kurdish father for having had a Swedish boyfriend. In a situation where many Turkish and Kurdish fathers encounter long periods of unemployment it is hardly surprising that men discuss issues of family honour. Pressures will build up among male companions to control "one's" women. If a daughter defies her father's will other men will put pressure on the father to deal with the situation. There have been four cases in recent years where girls or young women with family origins in the Middle East have been murdered by male relatives. There are virtually thousands of cases where teenage girls are threatened and maltreated by fathers and brothers for dressing 'inappropriately', or socializing with Swedish teenagers.

Segregated residential areas in major cities are not divided into ethnic enclaves. Rather, they house first and second generation migrants from a number of sending countries. Ålund (1997) presents a picture of second generation youth, which differs from the one of young threatened women struggling for emancipation. She illustrates how new cultural forms are created and given expression in popular music – hip hop, rap and even rock – where young teenage musicians and lyricists give voice to their experiences. Although girls partake in these activities, it is predominantly a world belonging to young men. The interpretive models provided by Turkish, Kurdish, Bosnian or Swedish cultures are insufficient to encompass the experiences made by the second generation. Linguists have shown independently that a new dialect of Swedish is developing in housing areas inhabited by the second generation. This dialect incorporates words and figures of speech from Turkish, Spanish, Persian, Kurdish, Arabic, Finnish etc.

5. Racism and discrimination

National front parties have on the whole not been able to establish themselves in the Swedish parliament, with the exception of *New Democracy,* a protest party criticising bureaucracy and playing on people's criticism of refugee policies. In the 1991 elections this party got enough (6 percent) votes for parliamentary representation, which it subsequently lost in 1994. New Democracy's achievement was to lure traditional parties into more restrictive stands on immigration, more or less adjusting their refugee policies to those of New Democracy.

Parties further to the far right have only attracted 1.5 percent of the electorate. Some groups criticizing migration policies resorted to violent means of protest. In the spring of 1990 a number of refugee camps were attacked with firebombs. Some were burnt down to the ground. At the time these events were real sensations in the media. The possibility cannot be ruled out that youngsters may have copied some attacks stimulated by the attention that was given to the crimes. However, gradually the media interest dwindled although the attacks on refugee camps continued for many years. Jewish cemeteries have repeatedly been desecrated and in 1993 a mosque in the town of Trollhättan was burnt down in an act of arson. Riots and fighting between skinheads and anti-racists in conjunction with the annual commemoration of king Charles XII (who died in battle 1719) also attracted the attention of the media in the early 1990s.

As a result of these events, skinheads increasingly became associated with Nazi ideology. In principle the traditional Nazi organizations were opposed to heavy drinking and the rowdy delinquent behaviour of the skinheads. However, skinhead culture proved to be a new useful source for recruiting members, but perhaps more important, through skinhead culture traditional moss-grown Nazi organizations linked up with rock-music, a strand of which developed into "white noise", the most powerful propaganda instrument the Nazis possess. While Swedes in general distanced themselves from the violent methods of the far right—arson, street-fighting etc., many were

becoming critical of the immigration and integration policies and could express in public that the anti-immigration criticism of the far right was essentially correct.

The neo-Nazis have no charismatic leader, which is one explanation why they have not been successful on the political arena. But it could also be that their ideas do not appeal to the majority. Democracy is deeply rooted and although people in general may be critical of immigration policies, they instinctively abhor undemocratic solutions. The principal targets of Nazi violence are marginalized groups—asylum seekers, non-Europeans, Jews and homosexual men. These are not social groups with whom the general public immediately identifies. Thus racist crimes committed by Nazi activists were compatible with the police view that these crimes were boyish pranks.

Discipline is a problem in schools. There is a certain amount of bullying among the pupils. Victims and perpetrators may be found among pupils of Swedish as well as of immigrant origin. Children who arrive at the age when they must attend school are disadvantaged, but the school system as such does not discriminate between pupils of different nationalities or origins. Immigrant children are entitled to special remedial classes in Swedish. There is no evidence of systematic discrimination but we cannot rule out that subtle forms of discrimination may be at work in classrooms. Students of immigrant and minority background may do well at school and be highly competitive. On the other hand there is also evidence of an overrepresentation of early school dropouts among students of migrant and minority origin.

For foreign citizens the unemployment index is consistently higher than for Swedish citizens, and much higher for non-Europeans than for Europeans. This may be due to the large influx of refugees in recent years that have not yet established themselves in the labour market. However, the Iranians should have had the time to establish themselves but they face a seriously high level of unemployment. These data reflect forces of discrimination operating in a subtle manner in the labour market. On the whole Nordic citizens appear to be accepted whereas east European and non-European citizens are encountering considerable difficulties of finding jobs. In turn this situation tends to reinforce negative stereotypes and prejudiced views of immigrants as being unwilling to work. A recent Eurobarometer survey shows that Sweden comes out quite well in a European comparison when it comes to attitudes towards immigrants. However, there is reason to question the reliability of this survey.

6. Constitutional protection, policies

Sweden has a strong constitutional protection against discrimination. It is effective with regard to discrimination on the basis of sex/gender, but considerably weaker with regard to race and ethnicity. However, a law court cannot judge by reference to the constitution. It is therefore necessary to have laws specifically aimed at counteracting discrimination. The criminal code

includes paragraphs against unlawful discrimination, and one paragraph against ethnic discrimination in working life.

The law against discrimination refers to any negative treatment on the grounds of colour, national or ethnic origin, language and creed. This law does not apply to an employment situation but to situations in which people are actually prevented from making use of a service, entering an establishment or a shop on the grounds of their ethnocultural origin. Another law, persecution of ethnic group, implies that it is against the law to express threats or disdain against an individual person on the grounds of his/her ethnic or national belonging through language, behaviour or by using specific symbols (i.e. Nazi symbols). The office of an Ombudsman against ethnic discrimination was instituted in 1987. However, it was not until in 1994 that the Ombudsman had the right to prosecute. Only one case of discrimination was tried in court but with no success. The burden of proof is too high. The proposal has been made that the burden of proof should be reversed. New legislation against discrimination with more teeth was introduced in 1999.

Sweden has a bad history of recognizing minority rights. It was not until 2000 that five minority languages were recognized as heritage languages of Sweden (Saami, Mienkäli, Finnish, Romany and Yiddish). There is constant discord between the Swedish state and the Saami organizations about land rights. Policies of naturalization are on the other hand liberal by European standards. Swedish citizenship follows the *ius sanguinis* principle. This means that children acquire the citizenship of their parents. Being born in Sweden does not automatically entitle one to Swedish citizenship (the *ius soli* principle). Sweden has however regarded naturalization as an important instrument for integration and has encouraged permanently residing immigrants to naturalize. For non-Nordic citizens five years of permanent residence is required, for Nordic citizens, two years. There are no language or knowledge tests, but there is a good-conduct clause. Foreign citizens who have been sentenced to prison for a criminal offence are not accepted.

As in other countries of immigration undocumented migrants and illegal migration do exist. Since the Schengen agreement came into force it has become more difficult to control borders for illegal migrants. Sweden has not accepted any policy of regularization of undocumented migrants. This would jeopardize the basis of the current immigration policy. There are no accurate statistics on the number of illegal and undocumented migrants. Quite a few enter the country on tourist visas and overstay. An increasing number of street peddlers, musicians and prostitutes from Russia and the Baltic states come by the ferries from Estonia and Finland. Quite a few of them are very young persons. Other illegal and undocumented migrants are asylum-seekers who escape into hiding once their applications are rejected. Whole families may live for months on end in the sanctuary provided by church buildings, where the police as yet have not forced their way of entry. The children that are hidden away like this are among the most exposed in society. They do not have the right to education or health-care.

The aims of the integration policy today are to promote diversity programmes at work-places. Basically these programmes are aimed to incorporate migrants into mainstream society. Different words appearing in this discourse over the years—integration, pluralism, multiculturalism and diversity—all seem to stand for accepting (certain) differences but "doing things in the Swedish way". Unofficially assimilation is still seen as the best solution. Integration "the Swedish way" basically boils down to a form of subtle assimilation. What the authorities ultimately aim at is control of societal development. Reforms that are introduced, no matter in what social domain, imply and rely on some form of bureaucratic societal control mechanisms. Social engineering has served as the means to achieve ends.

Today the codeword is diversity. Public acceptance for diversity needs to be achieved, but social engineering is not well adapted to achieve this aim. One might put it that the concession that the authorities are willing to make to an ethnocentric public opinion in order to achieve an acceptance for diversity is to keep future immigration at a minimum. Diversity, however, is linked with immigration. If immigration is stopped, true diversity will come to an end. We need to realize that the aims are contradictory.

7. Other information

The data upon which this survey draws are publications from the official bureau of Statistics (Statistics Sweden), The National Board of Labour, The National Board of Education and The National Board of Social Welfare. In some cases information is used from research carried out at universities. Information is potentially available on virtually any aspect of individual and societal life. However, there are strong legal restrictions on making this information generally available for ethical reasons. If particular information that is not published routinely is sought for research purposes an application has to be made to an ethical committee, which can approve of the research project. To access the information is then a matter of resources because it is not for free. For this report neither time nor funding permitted any specialized data access.

Table 5.3. Central variables in the Virta and Westin (1999) ICSEY study.

Domain	Variable	Operationalised scales etc.
Background	Demographic	Age Gender Socioeconomic status
Language	Language proficiency	Ethnic language proficiency Swedish language proficiency
Identity	Self identity	Ethnic self identification Swedish self identification
Acculturative stress	Acculturation attitudes	Assimilation Integration

		Separation
		Marginalisation
Group relations	Discrimination	Perceived discrimination
Family	Intergenerational conflict	Parental authority
		Children's rights
Psychosocial adjustment	Psychological well-being	Self-esteem
		Life satisfaction
		Psychological symptoms
	Social adjustment	School adjustment
		Behaviour problems

Virta and Westin (1999) collected data in a study in Stockholm schools with a large share of the second generation as part of an international international comparative study of ethnocultural youth. The same questionnaire is used in several countries.[39] The Swedish study focussed on Chilean, Finnish, Kurdish, Turkish and Vietnamese second generation youth 13-18 years of age, their parents, and a native Swedish control group from the same schools. The theory behind the study is John Berry's work on acculturative stress and Jean Phinney's work on ethnic identity, developed on the basis of empirical experiences in Canada and California. A central issue in intercultural encounters is how the individual relates to the ethnic minority group/culture and the majority group/culture respectively. Berry identified four acculturation strategies: assimilation (rejecting ethnic minority culture in favour of the majority culture), integration (combining bothcultures), separation (relying on ethnic minority culture only and rejecting majority culture) and marginalization (rejecting both cultures). Psychosocial adjustment of first generation migrants was found to be related to these strategies. Previous studies suggest that an integrative attitude is the most adaptive of the four options with marginalization as the least adaptive. Results relating to the role of assimilation and separation have been variable (Berry 1997). A number of variables were operationalised by an international team of researchers[40] and data were collected by means of a questionnaire distributed to pupils attending mother tongue classes.

The results of the Swedish study were unexpected and contradict popular images of second generation youth of non-European origin as losers. Space does not suffice to elaborate on the results of all participating groups in this study. I will concentrate on the results applying to Turkish (and Kurdish) adolescents in Sweden. Second generation Turkish pupils reported better life satisfaction and school adjustment, and less psychological symptoms and behavioural problems than Swedish adolescents. These differences were statistically significant. Kurdish adolescents reported intermediate positions. A

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[39] Besides Sweden also Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK in Europe.
[40] John W. Berry and Kyunghwa Kwak (Canada), Karmela Liebkind (Finland), Colette Sabatier (France), Jean Phinney (USA), David L. Sam (Norway), Erkki Virta and Charles Westin (Sweden).

possible explanation of the results may be a consequence of the sampling. The Swedish control group was sampled in the same schools in order to make correct comparisons. However, Swedish youth attending schools in predominantly segregated neighbourhoods are not representative of Swedish youth in general, but rather of social categories with few options but to live in low-status neighbourhoods. Controlling for social class, however, did not alter the outcome.

Another interesting finding was that second generation males in general reported better life satisfaction but a poorer social adjustment than females. However, second generation Turks deviated from this trend, with females reporting better life satisfaction but more problematic social adjustment than males. A possible interpretation is that young members of the second generation in general do not question adult authority at as early an age as Swedish and Finnish adolescents. Swedish education and upbringing aims at fostering independence and self-reliance at an early age. Young people in Sweden are encouraged to question authorities and elders. In schools this approach results in discipline problems, particularly in the 7th to 9th year of school. Youth of Turkish origin will undoubtedly also achieve independence, but their way to independence follows another course. Age was for instance for second generation Turks negatively related to school adjustment (increasing age correlates with greater problems of school adjustment). Ethnic self identification on the other hand predicted a benevolent adjustment. Girls and young women of the second generation are claiming their share of independence available in Swedish society, something that was denied their mothers. This may explain their sense of better life satisfaction in comparison to their male peers, and consequently also problems of social adjustment as demands for independence inevitably will clash with the values of patriarchal society as it is upheld by parents. The challenge is to find one's own way to acculturation. A Swedish self-identification does not predict good adjustment for the second generation of Turkish and Kurdish origin.

Testing the model developed by Berry clearly showed that an integrative attitude was the most adaptive for second generation youth, but also a separatist leaning was adaptive. The assimilative attitude on the other hand was related to problems of adjustment, as was the marginalisation attitude. These results indicate that second generation Turkish youth, in particular young women, benefit from the Swedish model of integration. Ethnic language proficiency clearly correlates with the adjustment variables.

We need to bear the methodological and theoretical limitations of this kind of study in mind. Berry's conceptualisation and operationalisation of the acculturative attitudes does for instance not do justice to the notion of marginalisation. His model is in a sense very static. Marginalisation is defined operationally as non-belonging, which by its very nature must be non-adaptive. The conceptualisation furthermore defines the options in relation to mainstream host society on the one hand and a minority culture in the home on the other. Given a more dynamic conceptualisation, marginalisation could alternatively be defined in positive terms. Rejecting traditional patriarchal values of the home, and rejecting the liberal (*lassaiz-faire)* values of Swedish society, does not

necessarily mean that one is at a loss. Marginalisation can also be understood in terms of social and cultural change, which is the position of second generation youth in Swedish society.

We find several indications that many second generation youngsters are doing well academically (a positive overrepresentation) and establishing themselves in certain niches of the developing multicultural society. Although there is every reason to be wary of the conflicts that inevitably accompany the shift towards a multicultural society forming on the rock-bottom of a nation-state, there is also every reason to feel a certain optimism.

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CHILDREN AND MIGRATION: UK

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1. Introduction

1.1 Methodological issues

Present day Britain is a multi-cultural society reflecting both where people have come from and the new cultures that have developed as a result of the meeting and mixing of races and cultures in every sector of national life. This does not imply that this is trouble free or that there is not still resistance or discrimination. There is, however, a growing realisation that Britain will never be a mono-cultural nation (Runnymede Trust, 2000) – if indeed it ever was. There is also a realisation that immigration is necessary to counterbalance an aging population and to develop a young skilled work force able to compete in a global market (Dobson and McLaughlan, 2001).

This review is based on official statistics, government and NGO reports and on academic research studies. It aims to give an overview of the current situation in the UK and to highlight areas of current debate both about past and present migration and the situation in relation to refugees. The UK national report of the Child Migration Project (CHIP) stressed the need to view current issues within a historical context both in terms of the histories of migrant groups but also in terms of changing social and political issues within the UK. The argument is that to separate migration from other social factors is to isolate ethnicity as the primary factor or variable in people's lives which then distorts the analysis of research data and policy directions. In relation to official statistics there are several methodological issues, listed below, that need to be considered before entering into the main body of this report. These relate to all the sections of this paper but are perhaps of prime importance in considering how to analyse settlement and the present day situation of multicultural life in the UK.

a. Children do not appear separately in the statistics from adults
It is often necessary to read between the lines in order to get a picture of where children sit or what are the main issues that affect them.

b. From available statistics it is difficult to get a picture of white immigration

Immigration to the UK has always been commonly understood as 'black' migration although currently immigration from the Old Commonwealth[41] is higher than any other group. Most writing and statistics concentrate on discussions of ethnic minorities. Since CHICAM is mainly concerned with this group this report also takes this focus although as an overall approach it is problematic.

c. The categorisations of ethnicity are confusing
Categories often mix nationality, language, region, skin colour and religion. This means that certain groups are highlighted while others become invisible. For example 'Turkish' is often classified under white so they don't appear as a separate group although their circumstances and needs might be different. It also means that differentiation within categories is impossible.

d. Categories are used in different ways by different surveys and different writers making comparisons and analyses confusing. Terms will also change over time with different political imperatives and understandings
Ethnic monitoring is relatively recent. There has been much discussion and many changes to how this is done. Some terms such as 'black' will be used in many different ways. Sometimes it is used as a political term that has even included Irish. At others it becomes specific to skin colour or again to region of origin as in 'black African' or 'black Caribbean' or ancestral origin 'Afro Caribbean'. Asian in the UK refers to people and countries near India (India itself, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka). It does not refer, as it does in Australia and New Zealand to Pacific rim peoples and countries.

e. Terms such as 'minority' and 'majority' imply fixed immoveable categories
This implies that the majority includes no differences while the minorities will have more in common with other minorities than with the majority. It takes no account of differences of class, region, gender age etc. within each category.

f. Many documents don't differentiate between newly arrived ethnic migrants and those who have been here for several generations.
This implies that all ethnic minorities are somehow foreign. It also takes no account of the different experiences of first and second generation. It also ignores the different experiences of immigrants from former colonies with historical connections, those who have family connections here and those arriving on their own.

g. Strict categorisations disallow self-determination. They don't reflect the fact that people use shifting terms and not fixed determinants. They have also (up to very recently) ignore those of mixed race.
The Parekh Report (Runnymede Trust, 2000) discusses the use of terminology and tries to avoid the use of terms they regard as misleading such as 'ethnic' and 'minority'.

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[41] Old Commonwealth refers to Australia, New Zealand and Canada. New Commonwealth refers to former colonies in the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. The distinction has the effect of separating out 'white' and 'black' migration.

Bearing all this in mind the following facts and discussion give no more than a general picture of the situation.

1.2 Basic national facts

The UK is composed of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Recently there has been a process of devolution of certain powers and the creation of regional assemblies for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, Westminster remains the national seat of power and legislation affecting children and migration is nationally consistent. The total population at mid 2000 was estimated at 52.9 million. The number of children of compulsory school age has been increasing since 1990 but is expected to decrease as there have been fewer births in the last few years (ONS, 2000).

Compulsory schooling is from 5 years old to 16 but there is increasing pressure and some incentives to stay in education or formal training till 18. Welsh is the only other main language and education in Wales follows a policy of bilingualism. Children progress through school according to age and are not kept back to redo a year. All children can attend school and there is very little possibility of locating children who are not eligible due to illegal immigration status.

The age of majority is confusing. At 18 you get the vote. At 17 you are allowed to drive. At 16 heterosexual sex is legal but not until 18 for homosexual sex.

2. Migration

The UK has always been a centre of international migration both inwards and outwards. It also has a long tradition of accepting refugees dating back to the Huguenots in the 1560s (Knox, 1997). This has not meant however that there has ever been an open door policy. Net international migration to England and Wales in mid 2000 totalled 180,000. Over 80% of international migration involves younger adults aged 15-44 (ONS). The history of immigration is marked by reactions to, and increasing restrictions of black immigration. Most discussions are still based on the assumption that immigration controls on black migration are necessary to maintain good race relations (Home Office 1998). Since CHICAM is concerned with refugee children who in the main will fall within this categorisation this is what I concentrate on here.

A post war labour shortage prompted the government to recruit from the colonies (what is termed the New Commonwealth), especially from the former West Indies. These migrant workers took up work in lower paid public services and industrial jobs. These were mainly younger people, often single men, who subsequently stayed on, had families or whose families joined them, and settled (Mason, 2000, Fryer, 1984).

Another form of post war immigration was students coming from the colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and Asia. Many came prior to Independence in their home countries and then returned to participate in independence movements.

Others came as a result of Independence. Their presence here, although temporary, affected the politics of race relations and assisted in challenging both popular and policy racism, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. It also gave it an international dimension.

The 1960s and 70s saw increased immigration as a result of conflicts arising from independence. Partition in India, for example, forced many from their homes some of whom sought a new life in the UK. During the 1970s there were several waves of sponsored refugee migrations. For example Ugandan Asians were accepted on an organised group basis. A significant development at this time was an increase of immigration from countries with no former colonial connections. For example the UK accepted a quota of Vietnamese refugees as a result of international agreements. Other migrants and refugees came from Latin America at this time e.g. Chile.

The 1990s saw increased numbers of immigrants coming from new areas of the world as a result of conflict and economic hardship. Increased immigration restrictions have meant that both refugees and migrants have sought new routes (Harding, 2000). There has been a radical increase in asylum applications and applications for citizenship. It is thought that many who would not previously have applied for asylum and who are 'economic refugees' are now applying (in White Paper for Immigration and Asylum Act 1999). This is calling into question the definition of refugee as defined by the 1951 UN Convention. On the other hand those who would be deemed refugees are being forced to resort to illegal entry along with other migrants as the only way of reaching safety. EU governments have responded by trying to co-ordinate regional restrictions leading to the term 'Fortress Europe' (Gordon, 1989).

2.2 Relevant Legislation

1948 British Nationality Act regularised the status of Commonwealth citizens as British citizens with full rights of entry and settlement
1962 Commonwealth Citizens Act aimed to control immigration from the Commonwealth for the first time issuing limited numbers of work vouchers.
1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act created 2 classes of British citizenship based on rules of patriality. The effect of this was to include Old Commonwealth citizens while excluding New Commonwealth citizens.
1971 Immigration Act brought in more restrictions with the result that the only New Commonwealth immigration was due to family reunification only.
1981 Nationality Act created a three tier citizenship whereby only those included under the patrials rule had rights of entry and settlement. This can mean that a child born in the UK to non citizens does not get citizenship and remains stateless unless patriality applies.

The overall effect of this legislation has been to restrict Black and Asian immigration.

2.2 Refugee figures/ asylum application

Since the mid 1980s, restrictions on refugees entering the UK have gradually

increased. This has meant that increasing numbers have been forced to enter the country illegally. This in turn has brought a perception of refugees as 'illegals' and as scroungers (Harding, 2000). The term 'bogus' has become a common prefix to 'refugee' and there has been a rise in anti-refugee sentiment which also directly affects children.

Since 1988 there has been a rise in asylum applications with peaks in 1991 and 1995. Since 1998 there has been a steep rise. In 1999 there was a sharp increase in refusals (42 % of applications) although in 2000 overall acceptances increased by 55,000 to 125,100 (Home Office). In 2000 there were 80,315 applications excluding dependants. The highest number of asylum applications to the UK came from nationals of Iraq (9% of applications), Sri Lanka (8%), FRY[42] (7%), Afghanistan (7%), Iran (7%) and Somalia (6%). (UNHCR). The number of applications from FRY have decreased while the numbers from Afghanistan have increased reflecting a changing international situation.

The 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act aimed to restrict freedom of movement and discourage more applications. It brought in a dispersal scheme whereby asylum seekers were housed in areas decided by the authorities, often away from support networks. It also brought in a voucher scheme that replaced benefit cash that both stigmatised and restricted where food could be bought. Several attacks on asylum seekers and an increasing awareness of the unworkability of the new schemes has forced the government to review the situation. However the government is committed to increased restrictions increasing detention accommodation and speeding up processing and deportations. Approximately 1000 asylum seekers are held in detention at any one time (Refugee Council) It is also keen to harmonise the approach to refugees throughout Europe.

Approximately 60% of asylum seekers are under 30 years of age (Home Office), some of these being separated children. In December 2000 there were an estimated 69,000 refugee children in UK schools; about 70% of them in Greater London (refugee Council 2000 helping refugee children in schools). In Greater London 4.5 of the school age population are refugees (Rutter 2001). The biggest groups of refugee school children in 2000 were: Somalis, Kosovars, Sri Lankan Tamils, Congolese and Turkish Kurds.

2.3 "Illegals"

In 1978 the Commission for Racial Equality stated that 'the problem of illegal immigration into the country does not appear to be a large one, judging by the number of people who came forward to avail themselves of the two amnesties which were granted during the period April 1974 to Dec 1978 (CRE 1979: 7). During these amnesties less than 5000 people came forward. However, no-one knows what the real situation is, as figures are only based on those people detained for illegal entry. In 1991 the Home Office stated that there had been 4,446 cases with a 35% increase since 1990. The largest groups at

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[42] Former Republic of Yugoslavia

that time were people from Nigeria, Turkey and Eastern Europe (Duvell and Jordan, 2000)

There has not been much academic research done on undocumented immigration (Duvell and Jordan, 2000) but recently there has been more interest due to the increase in slavery, trafficking and false documents with its links to organised crime (Fekete and Webber, 1997).

3. Special issues

3.1 separated children

The number of separated children arriving in the UK is increasing.
A recent report (Ayotte and Williamson, 2001) states that, despite the fact that separated children are defined as 'children in need' the main underlying problem with official attitude and policy is that immigration control takes priority over care of children. This means that separated children are dealt with under the Home Office rather than Social Services. There is a need for an agency with overall responsibility.

At present the Home Office keeps statistics on those children who apply for asylum at the port of entry and (since 1997) 'in country'. In addition the Home Office classifies separated children as those with no family member to look after them. This excludes those children who are with an older sibling or with an extended family member. Within these limits Home Office figures show that in 1992 there were 190 recorded applications. This increased in 1997 to 1107 and again in 1999 to 3,349 (45% from Kosovo). 70% of separated children live in the Greater London area and South East England.

The Home office funds a Panel of Advisors for children at the Refugee Council. Refugee Council figures show a different picture as they include children with extended family members. According to their records from April 1999 to March 2000 they received 4762 referrals of whom 11% were girls and 66% were between the ages of 16-17. In 1999 the main countries of origin (in descending order) were: FRY (mainly Kosovon), Afghanistan, Somalia, China, Albania, Turkey, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Romania, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Angola and the DR Congo.

There is a disturbing increase in smuggled or trafficked children which is in line with the overall increase in organized people trafficking. One reason for this is thought to be the general tightening up of immigration controls leading to more clandestine entry. However this does not account for children who appear to be part of criminal child labour and sex slave trafficking. West Sussex Social Services (near Gatwick Airport), for example, has found it necessary to open a permanent safe house with 24 hour protection for children believed to be part of an international trade and therefore in danger of abduction.

3.2 Muslims

There are approximately 2 million muslims living in the UK (European Union, 1999). Wider discussions of Islam were brought to the fore by the Satanic Verses affair. Before that there had been several public debates mainly concerning children; the wearing of the hijab at school, the desire for state funded Muslim schools. Recently there has been a growing concern about the rise in what has been termed Islamophobia (Runnymede Trust, 1997); discrimination against muslims for the their 'muslimness' as opposed to their separate ethnicities. This has increased or become more visible since the events of September 11[th 2001]. There has been a rise in attacks on community focus points such as mosques, prayer halls, schools, halal butchers etc.

At present UK law does not recognise religious discrimination and such attacks have to be charged either in general criminal terms or as 'racial violence'. It is difficult, however, to distinguish between racist and religious attacks in these instances. The Runnymede Trust Report (ibid) recommends that the legal term 'racial violence' should be extended to 'religious and racial violence'. They recommend that Race Equality Councils, Housing Authorities, Police and monitoring groups, also use this terminology in determining incidents of discrimination.

Two wider issues of identity arise from these debates. There has always been an assumption that immigrants will automatically abide by a belief in, and be integrated towards identifying with, the new nation state (Baubock, Heller and Zolberg, 1996). 'Political Islam' challenges this. For many the primary allegiance is to Islam and a transnational religious community. With new communications technologies this wider community is experienced more immediately and this has implications for everyday living and identity. The term 'ethnicity' therefore becomes problematic. Many young people no longer identify with an ethnic group determined by language or country but see their primary identity as Muslim.

4 Settlement

One in 14 people in UK in 2000-01 are from a minority ethnic group. In general ethnic minority groups have a younger age structure than the White population. (ONS, 2001). 50% of ethnic minority Britons were born here – 90% of those being under 15. Nearly 50% of all ethnic minorities live in London (Modood et al, 1997). There is a growing mixed race population. Recent reports (Runnymede Trust, 2000)) stress the multi-cultural nature of British society but there is still a marked rural /urban divide (Modood, 1997).

Number of ethnic minority members of population in UK
1951   74000
1971   1.3 mill
1991   3+ mill   5.9% of pop
1995   4+mill   8% pop

The 1991 Census categorized as follows:

Black communities	891,000	
African	212,000	
Afro-Caribbean	678,000	
South Asian Communities	1,480,000	
Indian		840,000 (this includes
groups such as Ugandan		
	Asians)	
Pakistani	477,000	
Bangladeshi		163,000
Other minority communities		
Chinese	157,000	
Other Asian	198,000	
Other		290,000
All minorities	3,015	
Majority communities	51,874	

(OPCS , 1991)

Here some of the methodological issues raised in the Introduction become clear. There is no differentiation between the different groups subsumed under Indian but primarily the problem lies with the idea of the majority community which becomes an undifferentiated mass but can also include 'white' minority groups such as Greek and Turkish and Irish.

4.1 **Housing and employment**

figures show some persistent strands of disadvantage although some patterns are changing. The 1991 census showed that Bangladeshis, Black Caribbeans and Africans were more likely to live in public housing. Indians were more likely than whites to own their own houses (Karn and Phillips, 1999, Modood etal, 1997). A more differentiated pattern of achievement and disadvantage is therefore emerging as compared with 20 years ago.

It is no longer possible to equate all ethnic minorities with low occupational and income levels, the picture needing to be more differentiated. **Unemployment** rates for Black, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are three times greater than for white people (ONS, 2001) with nearly one third of young people in these groups aged between 16-24 being unemployed. Modood (1992), however, maintains that the trend is towards a reassertion of immigrants to their status before migration. For example, on arrival in the UK many Indians were forced to take employment below their qualification level.

With the next generation these levels are being readjusted and Indians are doing well by all indices. However, those who came from poor rural backgrounds without qualifications are still severely disadvantaged. These groups also tend to be muslims (ibid). Modood (1997) maintains, therefore, that there is a need for a more differentiated approach to looking at ethnic minorities and disadvantage. There is also a need to include religion in the picture as the 2001 census is doing.

4.2 Political participation*:*

In order to reflect the multi-cultural nature of UK society there should be 42 ethnic minority members of Parliament. In fact there were 9 after the 1997 election. The same pattern is seen in local politics even in London (Anwar, 2001). The traditional Labour voting pattern among ethnic minorities is changing with some votes, particularly among Indian and Pakistani voters, now going to Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. As with the overall youth vote there is a high alienation factor showing low registration and voting. (Anwar, 1998).

4.2 Education

In the case of education we can see a clearer picture of the situation of children in particular. We can see a trend towards greater participation and achievement amongst ethnic minorities as a whole, especially in higher education, that will affect the overall picture as these students enter the work force and hopefully change the employment patterns. However, within this, there are clear patterns of class and social deprivation differences. It is clear from school achievement figures that it is difficult to separate class (as determined by employment and housing) and race factors. Gender differences are also significant with girls consistently outperforming boys.

Since 1988 education in schools has been governed by a National Curriculum. This has undergone several reviews. The latest of these co-incided with the publication of the Macpherson Report (1999) into the killing of a black youth – Stephen Lawrence. This report called into question the relevance of a 'colour blind' curriculum in multicultural Britain. The report urged the government to implement 'a national curriculum aimed at valuing cultural diversity and preventing racism, in order to better reflect the needs of a diverse society' (ibid) Citizenship education has been brought in as one measure aimed at achieving this but there are several core issues that need to be raised here.

a. Schools tend to be very segregated. This is due to several factors relating to housing, settlement, employment, past and present, and funding policies that favoured targeting ethnic groups and organisations rather than geographically poor neighbourhoods as a whole. However, recently the issue of segregation due to state funded religious schools has been raised again. This is partly as a result of a report (The Cantle Report) after disturbances in Northern towns during 2001 which highlighted the complete segregation of life in the white and Asian communities. Schools are seen as a primary place for

the development of multi-culturalism. However the government is still committed in principle to religious schools including new muslim schools.

b. Attainment and access to higher education There has been concern for some time about the under achievement of boys in general (including white boys) at GCSEs[43]. Despite recent improvements in the performance of all ethnic groups, differences remain (OFSTED 1999, Gilborn and Gipps, 1996). At least 60% of young people in other Asian and Indian groups are achieving 5 or more GCSEs at grades A– C compared with 50% of white, 39% of black and 29% Pakistani and Bangladeshi. Girls in all ethnic groups out perform boys at this level and therefore are more likely to go on to higher education (ONS, 2001). In post compulsory education (16+) ethnic minorities are well represented. The same is true for higher education although not in the older more prestigious universities. These institutions are now under pressure to change. 13% of undergraduates are from ethnic minorities as compared with 9% of the 18-24 age group (Modood etal, 1997). It is difficult to disentangle the effects of race and class at this level. There are more Indian students as compared with Bangladeshi or Pakistani or Black Caribbean, reflecting class differences (Blackstone, 1998).

c. School exclusions A disproportionate number of children permanently excluded from school are black boys (IRR, 1994,). Black Caribbean boys are 4 times more likely than white boys to be excluded (ONS, 2002)

d. English as an Additional Language and Refugee Education One of the changes brought about with the recent review of the National Curriculum was a change in focus and funding for support for ethnic minorities in schools (NALDIC, 1999). Previous funding came from the Home Office and was directed primarily at teaching English. The new grant is administered by the DFEE and has the broader remit of addressing the low achievement of particular ethnic groups overall, including those whose mother tongue is English.

e. Minority schools Some funding is available for minority schools but this is on an ad hoc basis and at local level. There is no national structure. These are often religious based schools and will often reflect the political, religious and regional differences of the country of origin.

5 Racism and Discrimination

During the 1960s and 70s the predominant attitude was towards the promotion of **multi-culturalism**. This prioritised individual attitudes and understandings of 'difference' often to the point of exoticising it. The issue of structural racism was glossed over (Parekh, 1998). This was within the context of heated action and debate. The rise of the National Front and the infamous speeches of Enoch Powell and others prompted anti-racists to

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[43] General Certificate of Secondary Education - National examinations taken at the age of 16 which determine who will go on to sit exams that will qualify them for higher education.

organise counter movements and pressure groups. But even the Scarman Report in 1981, that looked into the causes of the Brixton riots, sought to play down endemic institutional racism stressing local problems and individual attitudes. During the 1980s (the Thatcher era) there was little official recognition of racism despite several uprisings. The problem was seen more in terms of local difficulties and black people being the cause of any problem (Bourne, 2001). Mugging became a major issue, fanned by the police in the media, that justified heavy handed policing of black youth and bred widespread resentment (Hall, 1978, Gabriel, 1998).

The Macpherson Report in 1999 has been a watershed in this respect. It confronted the issue of **institutional racism**, not only in the police, but also within education, housing and employment. However, at the same time the rise in public panic about asylum seekers has encouraged a new form of racist backlash. Sivanandan (2001) has termed this 'xeno-racism' since the emphasis here is anti-foreign including both black and white. The rise in Islamophobia is also a significant recent problem (see above).

Racial harassment remains a serious problem. The results of a PSI survey (Virdee, 1997) suggest that in a 12 month period 20,000 people were racially attacked, 40,000 were the victims of racially motivated damage to property and 230,000 people were racially abused. Repeat attacks were a marked feature of these incidents. These contrast sharply with official police figures, which, in 1994-5, showed a total of 12,000 reported incidents. The fact that racial harassment is also perpetrated by the police themselves confirms a picture of distrust between police and ethnic minorities. The main perpetrators of attacks appear to be groups of young white males. This picture is confirmed by Birminham Racial Monitoring Unit which found that a quarter of racist attacks and harrassment was carried out by under 17yr olds. However, Virdee (1995) found that there are a significant number of men over 30 who are also responsible. For the first time the PSI survey (Virdee, 1997) included information on the effects of racial attacks on the victims. The most common reaction was to stop going out after dark, to increase security of their home and to stop their children from playing outside the home.

The overall picture is one of action and reaction (Mason, 2000). The re-emergence of an active far right party, the BNP, and its election successes has prompted a reactivation of anti-racist movements, monitoring groups and pressure on government to strengthen resistance. The dangers of increased segregation and youth alienation has been raised again in the Cantle Report and has reopened areas of debate about racism and discrimination.

6.   Constitutional protection, policies

There are five areas of law relevant to this section. Race Relations, Human Rights, Crime, Children's law and Equal Opportunities. I focus here on the first two as most directly relevant.

Anti discrimination culture in the UK is strong and deep rooted but sometimes contested. The UK has the most comprehensive race relations legislation in Europe (Mason, 2000) although recourse to European courts in relation to equal opportunities and human rights issues has been useful in putting pressure on the UK to update legislation in the areas of equal opportunities and human rights. The 2000 Human Rights Act, for example, finally incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into British legislation. Recent European initiatives, under Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, are another move in this direction.

The Parekh Report (1998), although criticised for under playing racism (Sivanandan, 2001), offers a vision for an inclusive society. Its three central concepts are equality, diversity and cohesion, moving away from ideas of integration of the minority with a majority. It makes wide-ranging recommendations for the promotion of such a society in all areas of public life. Its significance in this section is that it sets out a future in which public life is based on a positive vision of a multi-cultural Britain rather than a defensive one. Legislation is a necessary support, reminder and backup to such a vision.

The UK has no separate constitution as such but protections are built from separate pieces of legislation and a body of legal practice. In this area the primary piece of legislation is the 1976 Race Relations Act (Lester, 1998) which makes it unlawful to discriminate against anyone on grounds of race, colour, nationality (including citizenship), or ethnic or national origin. This Act broadened the scope of the 1968 Race Relations Act (which in turn had strengthened the original Act which came into force in 1965) and harmonised it with the current sex discrimination legislation. It now includes acts of the 'Crown', Education Authorities and establishments, Trade Unions, clubs and associations. It recognises both direct and indirect discrimination. It gives individuals recourse to the courts although the financial costs of this deter many from taking this course of action. Under this Act the government established the Commission for Racial Equality to enforce the law in the public interest. This body also advises individuals and organisations who wish to take legal action under the Act and acts as a pressure group to encourage organizations to adhere more closely to the law. The 1976 Act was amended after the recommendations of the Macpherson Report (2000 The Race Relations Amendment Act). The amended Act imposes general duties on many public authorities to promote racial equality (Bridges, 2001).

Monitoring is now increasingly recognised as crucial. The Macpherson Report has forced a more stringent ethos of monitoring within the police. The 1991 census was the first to include ethnicity and the recent 2001 census has extended this. Within the public services monitoring is now well established. The debate, however, now centres on how best to use this type of information.

Two other pieces of legislation are worth mentioning here. The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act introduced new assault, harassment and public order offences with significantly higher maximum penalties where it can be shown that the offence was racially aggravated. However, again, it is difficult to bring

legal action and many of those who have suffered discrimination or harassment do not do so.

Children are not directly covered in this legislation, although education and other public services are included under the 2000 Amendment to the 1976 Race Relations Act. In terms of general provisions of care, children fall under the 1989 Children's Act.

7 Other issues

I would like here to look forward to the second literature review on children and media and flag up several issues that have been discussed in our UK report.

The press in the UK have often been accused of fanning situations with regard to 'race' issues. This has recently been the case in relation to refugees and asylum seekers. This is a difficult area as the media are not responsible for attitudes as such but they give voice to already existing problems thereby opening the door or giving permission for the unacceptable to be heard or for prejudices to become 'facts'. The 'race' card has often been used successfully in pre-election campaigning and taken up by the press. In the last election the CRE tried to prevent this by asking all politicians to pledge not to do this. This in itself caused much furore and objection, not least in the press. The contradictions that are clear from the outline above were starkly exposed and then covered over again. The supposed relation between good race relations and immigration controls is often repeated with the effect that it becomes accepted.

In relation to television several surveys have shown that ethnic minority viewers feel that the media do not offer a true reflection of the multi-cultural nature of Britain today and rely too easily on stereotypes.

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